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Latino Inter-Ethnic Discrimination and the
“Diversity Defense”
Tanya K. Hernandez

Abstract

With the growing racial and ethnic diversity of the U.S. population and workforce, scholars have begun to address the ways in which coalition building across
groups will continue to be necessary but will become even more complex. The
growing scholarship has focused on analyzing how best to promote effective coalition building. Thus far, scholars have not examined what that growing racial and
ethnic diversity will mean in the individuated context of racial and ethnic discrimination claims. In other words, what will anti-discrimination litigation look like
when all the parties involved are non-White but a racial hierarchy is alleged to
exist nonetheless, and the plaintiffs are not necessarily interested in the group politics agenda of coalition building.
At the present time, the majority of inter-ethnic employment discrimination claims
that appear in the electronic databases of Westlaw and Lexis appear to be those in
which Latinos are involved alternatively as victims and as agents of discrimination in the workplace. Latinos are thus the focus of this exploration of inter-ethnic
discrimination. This focus on Latinos is supported by demographic projections
that one in four job seekers will be the child of a Latino immigrant by the year
2020 and that Latino workers will increase their representation in the workforce
from the current rate of 12% to 25% by the year 2050. Furthermore, as the fastest
growing ethnic/racial minority in the U.S., Latinos have been celebrated in the
public discourse as a multiracial people impervious to racial discrimination. Examining the context of Latino bias may thus have much to tell us about the ability
of legal actors to adequately recognize and articulate the harm of inter-ethnic discrimination claims before a judiciary primarily steeped in an understanding of
discrimination as solely a Black/White phenomenon.

Section I of this Article will present the literature that explicates the complexity of
Latino racial attitudes that is currently under-appreciated by many jurists. Section
II will then analyze the emerging Latino inter-ethnic employment discrimination
cases. The cases demonstrate a judicial inability to understand racial discrimination when it occurs in an inter-ethnic context. Furthermore, judges in these cases
are inappropriately creating what this Article terms the Diversity Defense to discrimination allegations. The Diversity Defense describes the way in which legal
actors view a racially diverse workplace as the equivalent of a racially harmonious
workplace. This equivalence is implemented by viewing people of color as all the
same, and overlooking the particular histories of racial animus within and across
different ethnic groups. Section III therefore proposes that legal actors begin to
address the particular litigation needs of inter-ethnic claims through a theory of
functional racism. The Functional Racism Theory that the Article proposes is designed to enable decision makers to more effectively identify the occurrence of
discrimination in inter-ethnic contexts.
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persuasive and unrealistic.1
With the growing racial and ethnic diversity of
the U.S. population and workforce,2 scholars have
begun to address the ways in which coalition building
across groups not only will continue to be necessary
but also will become even more complex.3

1

Recent

President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at

Yale University (June 11, 1962), available at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archiv
es/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03Yale06111962.h
tm.
2

See Mitra Toosi, A Century of Change: The Labor

Force, 1950 - 2050, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2002, at 15,
15 – 16, available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/05/art2full.pdf
(reporting U.S. Department of Labor projections that
almost half of the workforce of 2050 will be nonWhite and non-Anglo, with 24% Latino, 14% African
American, and 11% Asian or Pacific Islander).
3

See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Both Edges of the

Margin: Blacks and Asians in Mississippi Masala,
Barriers to Coalition Building, 5 ASIAN L.J. 7 (1998);
Kevin R. Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights: The
Need for, and Impediments to, Political Coalitions
Among and Within Minority Groups, 63 LA. L. REV. 759
(2003); Rogelio A. Lasso, Some Potential Casualties
of Moving Beyond the Black/White Paradigm To Build
Racial Coalitions, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 81
(2005); Robyn K. Mallett, Stacey Sinclair & Jeffrey
R. Huntsinger, What Intergroup Relations Research Can
Tell Us About Coalition Building, 12 WASH. & LEE J.
C.R. & SOC. JUST. 5 (2005); George A. Martínez,
African-Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of
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scholarship has focused on analyzing how best to
promote effective coalition building.4

Thus far,

Race: Toward an Epistemic Coalition, 19 UCLA CHICANOLATINO L. REV. 213 (1998); Mary Romero, Afterword:
Historicizing and Symbolizing a Racial Ethnic
Identity: Lessons for Coalition Building with a
Social Justice Agenda, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1599
(2000); Victor C. Romero, Rethinking Minority
Coalition Building: Valuing Self-Sacrifice,
Stewardship, and Anti-Subordination, 50 VILL. L. REV.
823 (2005); Susan Taing, Lost in the Shuffle: The
Failure of the Pan-Asian Coalition To Advance the
Interests of Southeast Asian Americans, 16 LA RAZA
L.J. 23 (2005); Reynaldo A. Valencia, What If You
Were First and No One Cared: The Appointment of
Alberto Gonzales and Coalition Building Between
Latinos and Communities of Color, 12 WASH. & LEE J.
C.R. & SOC. JUST. 21 (2005); Adrien Katherine Wing,
Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race
Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism,
63 LA. L. REV. 717 (2003); Note, The Ties That Bind:
Coalitions and Governance Under Section 2 Of The
Voting Rights Act, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2621 (2004).
4

See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, African American and

Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling,
in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS: LATINOS, BLACKS,

AND

AFRO-

LATINOS 247, 258 (Anani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Oboler
eds., 2005) [hereinafter NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS]
(“Because African Americans and Latinas/os suffer
common harms from racial profiling in law
enforcement, they would seem natural allies in
seeking to eliminate the practice.

However,
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scholars have not examined what that growing racial
and ethnic diversity will mean in the context of
individual racial and ethnic discrimination claims.
What will antidiscrimination litigation look like
when all the parties involved are non-White5 but
nonetheless plaintiffs allege that a racial hierarchy
exists and they are not necessarily interested in the
group-politics agenda of coalition building?6

This

cooperation between the African American and Latina/o
communities in the United States faces formidable
barriers.”).
5

Whiteness is treated in this Article as a social

construct with which a society bestows favored status
and class privilege upon the individuals referred to
as White in varying contexts.

See David Roediger,

Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of “White
Ethnics” in the United States, in TOWARDS
WHITENESS: ESSAYS

ON

RACE, POLITICS,

AND

THE

ABOLITION

OF

WORKING CLASS HISTORY

181, 181 - 98 (David Roediger ed., 1994) (describing
whiteness as a context-based category whose
assignment is influenced by class and citizenship).
Because whiteness is not considered a biological fact
in this analysis, the Article’s discussion of interethnic discrimination also includes cases in which
non-Anglo immigrants with fair skin are treated as
non-White because they are viewed with less favor
than White-Anglo citizens.
6

José E. Cruz, Interminority Relations in Legislative

Settings: The Case of African Americans and Latinos,
in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 229, 230
(describing instances of disinterest in the formation
of coalitions).
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Article focuses on the implications of increased
diversity for the operation of employment
discrimination law.
For instance, in a pro se petition alleging
employment discrimination,7 Mr. Olumuyiwa, a Nigerian
security guard, asserted that he and African American
security guards were hired at a lower wage ($7.00 per
hour) than Latino and Yugoslavian employees ($14.00
per hour) and received fewer hours than did other
guards at the discretion of the Hispanic supervisor,
who said he did not like the plaintiff because he was
Nigerian.

The supervisor also made overtly

discriminatory remarks, such as “Why is your blackass sleeping here?!

I am going to deduct two hours

pay from your black-ass paycheck!” and “We Hispanics
run this office!”

Because the rest of the management

personnel were also Latino, the plaintiff felt that
they condoned the supervisor’s poor conduct.

In that

context, a plaintiff like Mr. Olumuyiwa is likely to
be most concerned with having any harms he has
experienced at the hands of a workplace racial
hierarchy addressed before considering the importance
of political coalitions with the ethnic group members
who are comparatively advantaged by that hierarchy.
Unfortunately, neither the literature about coalition
building nor the employment discrimination
jurisprudence is presently capable of addressing the
problems of inter-ethnic discrimination plaintiffs
whose claims are not as extreme in their

7

Olumuyiwa v. Harvard Prot. Corp., 1999 WL 529553

(E.D.N.Y. July 21, 1999).
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manifestation of overt Latino anti-Black sentiment.8
As this Article will explicate, non-White racial
hierarchies appear opaque to decisionmakers and other
legal actors, who find it difficult to recognize the
indicators of discrimination.

Agents of

discrimination are perceived as uniformly WhiteAnglos9 and all incidents are envisioned as having a
White-versus-non-White dynamic.10

8

For instance, the

Id. at *6 (granting plaintiff’s motion to amend

complaint).
9

The term “White-Anglo” is used in this Article to

distinguish those viewed as White in the United
States from the many Latinos who also appear
Caucasian.

In analyzing the interplay of race and

ethnicity in employment discrimination cases, it is
important to be specific about the background of the
parties.

For that same reason the term “African

American” is used to distinguish those viewed as
Black in the United States from the many Latinos who
are also of African descent living in the United
States.

It is useful to be ethnically specific in

referring to populations of African descent in order
to provide a more nuanced account of Latino racism
that does not conflate identifiable Afro-Latinos with
Latinos of more prominent European ancestry.
10

There is a growing body of literature that

discusses the various ways in which the legal system
manifests a view of racism as solely involving
African Americans and White-Anglos.

The focus of

that literature has been upon illustrating how the
Black/White binary obfuscates the operation of White
racism against many other racial groups.

This

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
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Article instead focuses upon how the binary
obfuscates the racial attitudes of racial group
members themselves.

See, e.g., Juan Perea, The

Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal
Science” of American Racial Thought, 10 CAL. L. REV.
1213, 1257 (1997) (discussing how the Black/White
binary focus upon White racism against Blacks does
not fully explain White racism against other racial
groups); see also Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How
the García Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding
The Language of Title VII Decisions Approving
English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism,
Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 10 LA
RAZA L.J. 261, 261, 268 (1998) (defining “racial
dualism” as “the tendency of courts to view civil
rights discourse in terms of Blacks and Whites to the
exclusion of Browns and other people of color” which
thereby “makes Latinos and their problems in the
workplace invisible”); Robert S. Chang, Toward an
Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81
CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1267 (1993) ("To focus on the blackwhite racial paradigm is to misunderstand the
complicated racial situation in the United States.");
Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing
in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 695, 696 (1996) ("An
historical assessment of the relationship of other
groups of color to a black/white paradigm reveals the
paradigm as not only undescriptive and inaccurate,
but debilitating for legal analysis, as well as civil
rights oriented organizing."); Angela P. Harris,
Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL.
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
fails to collect any data about the race of those
individuals who are agents of discrimination and
racial harassment in the workplace.

While this is

L. REV. 741, 775 & n.169 (1994) (“Race-crits’
understanding of ‘race’ and ‘racism’ might also
benefit from looking beyond the struggle between
black and white.

African American theorists have,

until now, dominated CRT, and African American
experiences have been taken as a paradigm for the
experiences of all people of color.”); Elizabeth
Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our
Time, 20 SOC. JUST. 22 (1993); Rachel F. Moran,
Foreword: Demography and Distrust: The Latino
Challenge to Civil Rights and Immigration Policy in
the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 4 (1995);
Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not
Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957
- 59 (1995); William R. Tamayo, When the “Coloreds”
Are Neither Black nor Citizens: The United States
Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration, 2 ASIAN
L.J. 1, 7 - 9 (1995); Frank Wu, Neither Black nor
White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 225, 248 (1995) ("The time
has come to consider groups that are neither black
nor white in the jurisprudence of race . . . .

Race

is conceptualized as breaking down into two allencompassing and mutually exclusive categories, black
and white."); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth
Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical
Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1181, 1196 (1997) (book review).
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presumably because the EEOC targets discrimination by
employers, not individuals, the absence of racial
data about the employers’ representatives implicitly
furthers the narrative that racism in the United
States is solely a White/non-White problem.

One EEOC

attorney has even stated that there has been a
“reluctance to bring cases against other
minorities.”11

This reluctance exists even though the

EEOC is beginning to see more cases in which
different racial/ethnic groups are set against each
other in the allocation of job opportunities.12

11

Miriam Jordan, Blacks vs. Latinos at Work: More

African Americans Claim They Are Passed Over for
Hispanics in Hiring, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2006, at B1
(quoting EEOC regional attorney Anna Park).
12

See, e.g., EEOC v. Cloughtery Packing Co., No.

2:04-cv-08051-GAF-PLA (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2005),
available at http://www.morelaw.com/verdicts
(settling discrimination claim for $110,000 where
Black applicants alleged they were denied employment
so that pork packing employer could hire Latino
applicants instead); EEOC v. Raytheon Technical
Servs., No. CV 02-00735 (D. Haw. Nov. 5, 2004),
available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/settlements/index.html
(settling discrimination claim for $165,000 where
Black paint contractor allegedly was denied
employment in favor of Asian/Pacific Islander paint
contractors); EEOC v. Pac. Micr. Corp. No. 02-0015
(D. N. Mar. I. Mar. 3 2004), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/settlements/index.html
(settling discrimination claim for $400,000 where

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Hernández (CRCL)

01/26/09 9:45 AM

Page 10

Indeed, employers generally demonstrate a preference
for particular racial or ethnic groups in the labor
market beyond a mere economic preference for low-wage
immigrant workers.13

For instance, among immigrant

more than forty employees of Filipino origin had been
replaced by employees from countries other than the
Philippines); see also Jordan, supra note 11, at B1
(describing $180,000 EEOC settlement with Zenith
National Insurance Corp., based upon the allegation
that ten Black applicants were denied a position in
the mailroom in favor of a Latino applicant with no
mailroom experience);

W. Matt Meyer, Here Is a

Twist--Firm Is Fined for Hiring Too Many Hispanics
and Not Enough Black and White Workers, Pictsweet To
Amend for Prejudicial Hiring, HISP. VISTA, July 14,
2003, at 1 (describing a settlement agreement between
United Foods Inc. and the U.S. Department of Labor’s
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs for
discrimination in systematically excluding African
American and White job applicants in favor of hiring
Latinos).

The preference for Latino workers over

African Americans may also contribute to the
disparate unemployment rates that each group suffers.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that the
unemployment rate among African Americans is rising
twice as fast as that of Whites.

In contrast,

overall Latino unemployment is in line with that of
the nation as a whole and Latinos have fared better
with an expansion in manufacturing jobs. Louis
Uchitelle, Blacks Lose Better Jobs Faster as MiddleClass Work Drops, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at A1.
13

PHILIP MOSS & CHRIS TILLY, STORIES EMPLOYERS TELL: RACE,
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workers, employers prefer those with lighter skin
tone.14
Similarly, despite the fact that a significant
level of overtly anti-Black Latino gang violence
occurs in the state of California; Chicago, Illinois;

SKILL,

AND

HIRING

IN

AMERICA 116 - 17 (2001). The authors

report racial distinctions made by employers
regarding the desirability of different racial/ethnic
group employees in the Russell Sage Foundation MultiCity Study of Urban Inequality, as demonstrated by
respondents identifying Latinos six times more
frequently than African Americans as preferred
workers.

This attitude is reflected in one

respondent’s statement that “Spanish people are more
willing to work.
hours.

They are willing to work longer

I think the ones that I’ve known are very

dedicated to their jobs.” See also John J. Betancur,
Framing the Discussion of African American-Latino
Relations: A Review and Analysis, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR
FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 159, 160 (summarizing the
literature detailing employer preferences for one
racial group over another with a racial ordering of
segmented employment roles by status and wage).
14

Joni Hersch, Profiling the New Immigrant Worker:

The Effects of Skin Color and Height (Vanderbilt Law
& Econ., Research Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927038 (noting that a
2003 study of 8600 recent immigrants found that
light-skinned immigrants in the United States make
more money on average than those with darker
complexions, even when controlling for race and
nationality).
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and most recently in Perth Amboy, New Jersey,15 the
FBI’s statistical collection of hate-crime incidents
fails to provide a mechanism for assessing the number
of Latino offenders.

Instead, the FBI tabulates

suspected offenders as White, Black, American
Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Pacific Islander, MultiRacial, and Unknown.16

Thus, the existence of Latino

hate crime perpetrators is statistically invisible
despite news reports of its occurrence.17

15

In turn,

See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Effort To Re-

Integrate Jail Sparks New Disturbance, L.A. TIMES, May
10, 2000, at B4 (reporting three days of rioting
after Latino inmates, acting on orders from the
Mexican Mafia prison gang, began attacking African
American inmates, prompting prison officials to
segregate the inmates by race, after which the
Latino inmates refused to be re-integrated with
African American inmates); Suzanne C. Russell, Perth
Amboy Gang Tensions Worry Parents, HOME NEWS TRIB., Apr.
7, 2004 (reporting harassment of African American
athletes by a Dominican gang of students known as the
“D Block”).
16

See FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS

OF

HATE CRIME (1995),

http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hatecm.htm.
17

See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Kareem Fahim,

Racial Slur Preceded Slashing of 3 in Manhattan,
Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at Metro 37
(reporting attack on three Asian men by three
Hispanic men wielding a box cutter and yelling a
derogatory term for Chinese people); Robert Siegel &
Melissa Block, All Things Considered:

California

Prisons on Alert After Weekend Violence (National
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the notion that hate crime is solely a White/nonWhite phenomenon is maintained.18

Public Radio broadcast Feb. 6, 2006) (reporting two
weekend race riots between Latino and African
American inmates, which culminated in prison
officials segregating the inmates by race and Latino
inmates sending prison officials a letter that
stated, “No disrespect . . . but if blacks come in
the dorms we will fight.”); News Brief, Center for
the Study of Hate and Extremism, Los Angeles Hate
Crime Leads to Hijacked Bus, May 3, 2001, available
at
http://hatemonitor.csusb.edu/NewsHeadlines/may01_news
_briefs.html#LA%20Hate%20Crime (reporting shooting of
African American by Latino who stated he did not like
African American men associating with Latina women);
see also JAMES E. JOHNSON & BILL LANN LEE, U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY

ET AL.,

OF

NATIONAL CHURCH ARSON TASK FORCE (1998),

available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/church_arson/arson98.html
(reporting arrest of Hispanic suspect for burning an
African American house of worship).

In addition,

some municipal arrest records reflect the existence
of Latino hate crime perpetrators.

See Brian Levin,

A Dream Deferred, 20 J. INTERGROUP REL. 3, 22 (1993)
(indicating that 42% of those arrested for racial
hate crimes in Los Angeles in 1992 were Latino, and
9% of those arrested for racial hate crimes in Boston
in 1991 were Latino).
18

See Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados:

On the Making of

Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 970 (1995)
(describing the ways in which the relative lack of
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As Eric Yamamoto notes, the traditional civil
rights approach focuses on conflicts with Whites and
not with other communities of color.19

He also

observes that the focus on White-Anglos underappreciates the extent to which inter-ethnic
conflicts can quickly escalate into inter-group
controversies because of the deep and often
unacknowledged racial grievances.20

Yamamoto

recommends that in order to build more effective
coalitions, civil rights attorneys should envision
racial justice practice as something more than the
enforcement of civil rights laws.

They should

instead deploy interracial justice inquiries in the
venue of grassroots organizing in order to
acknowledge how racial groups harm one another.
Yamamoto’s work, however, does not examine the focus
of this Article:

the development of a conceptual

framework for effectively presenting and
understanding inter-ethnic discrimination claims with
the goal of disrupting the judiciary’s singular focus
on White/non-White discrimination.
This Article treats “inter-ethnic
discrimination” as discrimination among non-White

positive public identity and legitimacy of Latinos
creates an image of racial conflict as existing
solely between African Americans and White-Anglos).
19

ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT &

RECONCILIATION
20

IN

POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 38 (1999).

See Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical

Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS,
AND A

NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 379, 386 (Francisco Valdes

et al. eds., 2002).
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The concept is defined

broadly to include discrimination among members of
different ethnic subgroups, such as discrimination by
Puerto Ricans against Dominicans or by White Latinos
against Afro-Latinos.

Inter-ethnic discrimination is

viewed expansively in order to depict the many ways
non-White ethnic groups and subgroups are complicit
in maintaining racial hierarchy in the workplace.
Thus, the classic disparate treatment employment
discrimination cases, in which White employers
exclude or differentially treat particular
racial/ethnic groups, are not part of this
examination of inter-ethnic discrimination.21

21

See supra note 12 (detailing cases in which the

EEOC has successfully settled allegations of White
employers awarding job opportunities to one
racial/ethnic group at the expense of another).
While the EEOC often is able to settle classic
disparate treatment cases involving White employers,
plaintiffs have met with judicial resistance when
they allege disparate treatment by White employers
who rely on word-of-mouth hiring methods that
disproportionately exclude African Americans while
overwhelmingly including other racial/ethnic groups.
But see EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d
292, 298 – 99 (7th Cir. 1991) (observing that
exclusionary word-of-mouth hiring methods can support
a finding of discrimination when an employer is
actively involved in soliciting employees for wordof-mouth applicant recommendations).

The Seventh

Circuit later upheld a judgment of discrimination by
a Polish employer who used word-of-mouth recruitment
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Furthermore, the dearth of reported cases involving
systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact in
the inter-ethnic context precludes the specific
examination of those forms of discrimination in this
Article’s analysis of inter-ethnic discrimination.22

practices that benefited Polish and Latino employees
while completely excluding African American
applicants. EEOC v. O&G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty
Co., 38 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 1994).

This result

accords with the general understanding that word-ofmouth recruitment policies creating a predominantly
White workforce or job category can establish a
discrimination violation.

See, e.g., Grant v.

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980);
Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir.
1975).
22

In one noteworthy systemic disparate treatment

inter-ethnic discrimination case, the Seventh Circuit
held that the passive use of word-of-mouth
recruitment by the Korean owner of a janitorial and
cleaning services company could not in and of itself
give rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination in the absence of evidence that the
owner was biased in favor of Koreans or prejudiced
against any group underrepresented in its work force.
EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir.
1993).

Although this case has been assailed for

underestimating the discriminatory effects of intraethnic group preferences in the workplace, it should
be noted that unlike the disposition of the emerging
individual disparate treatment inter-ethnic cases
analyzed in this Article, Consolidated Service does
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The majority of inter-ethnic employment
discrimination claims appear to be those in which
Latinos are involved alternatively as victims and as
agents of individual disparate treatment in the
workplace.23

Latinos and individual disparate

treatment cases are thus the focus of this
exploration of inter-ethnic discrimination.24

This

focus is warranted by demographic projections that
one in four job seekers by the year 2020 will be the
child of a Latino immigrant and that Latino workers
will increase their representation in the workforce
from the current rate of 12% to 25% by the year
2050.25

Latino-owned businesses have also increased

not foreclose the possibility that racial
discriminatory intent might exist simply because the
company owner is Korean.

Indeed, the court took

pains to note that the assessment of the case would
have been different if evidence of racial animus had
been presented or if the owner had been actively
engaged in deploying the word-of-mouth hiring method
rather than passively benefiting from his employees’
self-initiated use of the method. Id. at 236.
23

See infra note 125 and accompanying text (detailing

the inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases in
LexisNexis and Westlaw).
24

See infra notes 125 - 131 and accompanying text

(describing the nature of an individual disparate
treatment case and its importance to the emerging
inter-ethnic discrimination cases).
25

Employment: Second-Generation Latinos To Exert

Major Workforce Influence, Pew Report Says, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 199, at A-7 (Oct. 15, 2003); see
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In 1997 alone, Latino-

owned businesses employed 1,492,773 people.27
Furthermore, as the fastest-growing28 ethnic/racial
minority29 in the United States, Latinos have been
celebrated in the public discourse as a multiracial
people incapable of racial discrimination.30

also RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW HISPANIC CTR., LATINO LABOR REPORT
2006: STRONG GAINS

IN

EMPLOYMENT (2006), available at

http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/70.pdf.
26

U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., MINORITIES

IN

BUSINESS 1 (1999),

available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/min.pdf.
27

Id. at 23.

28

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION

IN THE

UNITED

STATES: MARCH 2002, at 20-545 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-545.pdf
(reporting that the nation’s Hispanic population grew
much faster than the population as a whole,
increasing from 35.3 million in 2000 to 38.8 million
in 2002, and constituted 12.5% of the 2000 census
population, excluding the 3.8 million residents of
Puerto Rico).

The Latino population is projected to

constitute one quarter of the U.S. population by
2050. Dick Kirschten, Hispanics: Beyond the Myths,
NAT’L. J., Aug. 14, 1999, at 2350, 2351.
29

See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure:

The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1143 (1997) (describing how Latinos can be positioned
to be both an ethnic group and a racial group).
30

See Silvio Torres-Saillant, Inventing the Race:

Latinos and the Ethnoracial Pentagon, 1 LATINO STUD. J.
123 (2003) (describing how Latinos take pride in
being enlightened about race relations because they
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Examining Latino bias may tell us much about the
ability of legal actors to recognize and articulate
the harm of inter-ethnic discrimination in a legal
system steeped in an understanding of discrimination
as solely a White/non-White phenomenon.
In the emerging body of inter-ethnic
discrimination cases, Latinos figure prominently in
allegations of employment discrimination in ways that
contradict the image in public discourse of a
multiracial people who do not racially discriminate.
In these cases, judges seem unable to appreciate
Latino manifestations of bias for two reasons.
First, judges appear to be unfamiliar with Latin
American racial ideology and how Latinos in the
United States express racial bias.

Second, they

are a “racially mixed” people); Silvio TorresSaillant, Epilogue: Problematic Paradigms: Racial
Diversity and Corporate Identity in the Latino
Community, in LATINOS: REMAKING AMERICA 435 (M.M. SuarezOrozco & M.M. Paez eds., 2002) [hereinafter TorresSaillant, Problematic Paradigms] (discussing the
dangers of “current assertions of a harmonious
panethnic Latino identity”);

see also JOHN FRANCIS

BURKE, MESTIZO DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS

OF

CROSSING BORDERS

(2002) (arguing that the Latino “mestizaje” mixed
race experience offers an ideal model for fostering
unity); Lynette Clemetson, Hispanic Population Is
Rising Swiftly, Census Bureau Says, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 2003, at A22 (“[Latinos] just don’t see the world
divided into such stark boxes, and that has to be a
real engine for change.” (quoting Roberto Suro,
director of the Pew Hispanic Institute)).
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impute to diverse workplaces a shield against
discriminatory treatment claims.

This is best

exemplified by one judge’s explicit claim that
“[d]iversity in an employer’s staff undercuts an
inference of discriminatory intent.”31

Such a

presumption both contravenes established employment
discrimination doctrine and impairs a thorough
inquiry into inter-ethnic employment discrimination
claims.

Indeed, it effectively operates as a defense

to discrimination in individual disparate treatment
cases when an accusation of inter-ethnic
discrimination is at issue.
This Article uses the term “diversity defense”
to describe the way in which legal actors view a
racially “diverse” workplace as the equivalent of a
racially harmonious workplace, thereby failing to
recognize incidents of discrimination and the
relevant case law.

Viewing all people of color as

the same and overlooking the particular histories of
racial animus within and across different ethnic
groups can cause a perceived equivalence of workplace
diversity and racial harmony.

The lack of judicial

knowledge about non-White racial hierarchies
generally, and Latino ethnic/racial differences and
attitudes specifically, facilitates the inclination
to construct a diversity defense.

Then, in a

circular fashion, the diversity defense hinders
judicial awareness of Latino heterogeneity and interethnic strife.

In response, this Article proposes a

“Multiracial Racism Litigation Approach” (“MRLA”) to

31

Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9,

2004).
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enable decision-makers to identify and address
discrimination in inter-ethnic contexts.
Part I of this Article will present the social
science literature illuminating the complexity of
racial attitudes among Latinos, which judges
generally do not appreciate.

Part II will analyze

the emerging Latino inter-ethnic employment
discrimination cases.

These cases demonstrate that

judicial inability to recognize racial discrimination
when it occurs in an inter-ethnic context leads
judges to deploy an inappropriate diversity defense
to discrimination claims.

Part III therefore

proposes that legal actors address the particular
litigation needs of inter-ethnic claims through a
multiracial racism lens.

The proposed MRLA focuses

on how an ethnic/racial group is advantaged or
disadvantaged depending on the context.

As such, it

is better able to elucidate and address the harms of
inter-ethnic employment discrimination, without
imputing magical powers to the existence of workplace
diversity.

I. LATINO RACIAL ATTITUDES

Before presenting the emerging Latino interethnic discrimination cases, it is important to
explore the social science data about Latino racial
attitudes that judges have overlooked.

With a

foundation in the social science literature, one can
more clearly appreciate the missteps of the cases.

A. The Origins of Latino Racism
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The manifestation of Latino racism in the United
States is the result of a complex interaction of
Latin American/Caribbean racial attitudes and selfesteem-boosting responses to being racialized as
Latinos in the United States.

Most relevant for this

analysis of inter-ethnic employment discrimination is
the interplay of Latino anti-Black racial attitudes.32
They are most relevant because the emerging interethnic Latino cases discussed herein involve
workplace settings in which Latinos are identified as

32

Latino anti-Asian bias is an under-studied area

that warrants empirical research.

Just a few

scholars have begun to address the issue of Asian
ethnicity in Latin America.

See JEFFREY LESSER,

NEGOTIATING NATIONAL IDENTITY: IMMIGRANTS, MINORITIES
STRUGGLE

FOR

ETHNICITY

IN

AND THE

BRAZIL (1999); Evelyn Hu Dehart,

Chinese Coolie Labour in Cuba in the Nineteenth
Century: Free Labour or Neo-Slavery?, in THE WAGES

OF

SLAVERY 67, 68 - 70 (Michelle Twaddle ed., 1993); Mieko
Nishida, Japanese Brazilian Women and Their Ambiguous
Identities:

Gender, Ethnicity and Class in Sao Paulo

(Latin Am. Stud. Ctr., Univ. of Md., College Park,
Working Paper No. 5, 2000).

In contrast, prejudice

against those of indigenous ancestry in Latin America
is well documented in social science literature.
See, e.g., STRUGGLES

FOR

SOCIAL RIGHTS

IN

LATIN AMERICA (Susan

Eva Eckstein & Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley eds., 2002)
(detailing the indigenous peoples’ struggle against
discrimination in Latin America).

However, neither

anti-Asian nor anti-indigenous bias has been
implicated in the emerging Latino inter-ethnic
employment discrimination cases reported thus far.
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agents of anti-Black bias and discrimination against
African Americans and Afro-Latinos.

Presented with

these cases, judges are often unable to recognize the
details of Latino anti-Black racial discrimination,
despite their willingness to entertain claims of
anti-Latino bias made by African Americans.33
It is useful to first summarize Latin American
and Caribbean perspectives about Afro-Latinos, that
is, their own Afro-descendants, before discussing how
those perspectives inform Latino attitudes toward
African Americans in the United States.

33

The

It may well be that the apparent judicial

predisposition to consider the culpability of Black
defendants in anti-Latino bias employment claims is
part and parcel of the general proclivity for more
readily accepting the possible culpability of Black
defendants in contrast to other racial groups.

See,

e.g., Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of
African-Americans in the Selective Enforcement of
Laws:

In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L.

REV. 721 (2004).

Therefore, while inter-ethnic cases

of anti-Latino bias do exist, they have not thus far
led to judicial confusion in the inquiry into
discrimination and are therefore not the subject of
this Article.

See, e.g., Limes-Miller v. City of

Chicago, 773 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(dismissing claim of Latina plaintiff who failed to
show that her employer’s stated reason for layoffs
was a pretext for national-origin discrimination in
an inter-ethnic workplace in which plaintiff failed
to prove that Blacks were promoted at higher rates
than others).
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presentation of Latin American race ideology is not
at all meant to suggest that all Latinos are racist
or harbor these racialized perspectives.

Admittedly,

group-focused discussions always run the risk of
suggesting an essentialized view of a group.34

This

data about Latino racial perspectives is provided to
demonstrate the nature of Latino racial stereotypes
of which legal actors in the United States may
otherwise be ignorant and which they must understand
in order to recognize the discriminatory conduct of
Latinos who act upon such stereotypes.35
It is not intended to insinuate that all Latinos
think a particular way.
Racism, in particular anti-Black racism, is a
pervasive and historically entrenched fact of life in

34

An essentialized approach to understanding groups

is marked by the notion that human identity
categories are fixed and exist trans-historically and
transculturally.

See Cheshire Calhoun,

Denaturalizing and Desexualizing Lesbian and Gay
Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1859, 1863 (1993).
35

See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228

(1989) (concluding that an employer’s expressions of
stereotypical views about a protected group such as
women could be admitted as evidence that an adverse
employment decision was impermissibly motivated);
see also Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian
Women and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
57, 95 (1994) (proposing the use of essentialized
notions of culture in criminal law cases for the
limited purpose of explaining an individual’s state
of mind and cultural influences).
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Over 90% of the

approximately ten million enslaved Africans brought
to the Americas were taken to Latin America and the
Caribbean, whereas only 4.6% were brought to the
United States.36

As such, the historical legacy of

slavery is pervasive in Latin America and the
Caribbean.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, as in

the United States, lighter skin and European features
increase one’s chances for socioeconomic advancement,
while darker skin and African or indigenous features
severely limit such opportunity and social mobility.37
The poorest socioeconomic class is populated
primarily by Afro-Latinos, while the most privileged
class is populated primarily by Whites; an elastic
intermediary socioeconomic standing exists for some
light-skinned (mixed-race) “Mulattos” and
“Mestizos.”38

For instance, until the Cuban

revolution in 1959, certain occupations used explicit
color preferences to hire Mulattos to the complete
exclusion of dark-skinned Afro-Cubans, based on the
premise that Mulattos were superior to dark-skinned
Afro-Cubans, though not of the same status as

36

Miriam Jimenez Román, Un Hombre (Negro) del Pueblo:

José Celso Barbosa and the Puerto Rican “Race” Toward
Whiteness, 8 CENTRO 8, 12 (1996).
37

Tanya Katerí Hernández, Multiracial Matrix: The

Role of Race Ideology in the Enforcement of
Antidiscrimination Laws, a United States – Latin
America Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1121 - 22
(2002) [hereinafter Hernández, Multiracial Matrix].
38

Id. at 1121 - 25.

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Hernández (CRCL)

01/26/09 9:45 AM

Page 26

Whites.39
White supremacy is deeply ingrained and
continues into the present.

For example, in research

conducted in Puerto Rico during the 1997 - 1998
academic year, the overwhelming majority of the 187
college students interviewed described “Puerto Ricans
who are ‘dumb’ as having ‘dark skin.’”40

Conversely,

the same students correlated light skin color with a
description of “Puerto Ricans who are physically
strong.”

Such negative perspectives about African

ancestry are not limited to college students.

In

1988, when the presiding governor of Puerto Rico
publicly stated, “The contribution of the black race
to Puerto Rican culture is irrelevant, it is mere
rhetoric,” it was in keeping with what social
scientists describe as the standard paradox in Puerto
Rico:

Puerto Ricans take great pride in the claim of

being the whitest people of the Caribbean islands,
while simultaneously asserting they are not racist.
The pride of being a presumably White population is a
direct reaction to the Puerto Rican understanding
that “black people are perceived to be culturally
unrefined and lack ambition.”41

39

The Puerto Rican

Tanya K. Hernández, An Exploration of the Efficacy

of Class-Based Approaches to Racial Justice: The
Cuban Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135 (2000).
40

Ronald E. Hall, A Descriptive Analysis of Skin

Color Bias in Puerto Rico: Ecological Applications to
Practice, 27 J. SOC’Y. & SOC. WELFARE 171, 177 - 78
(2000).
41

Arlene Torres, La Gran Familia Puertorriqueña “Ej

Preta De Beldá” (The Great Puerto Rican Family is
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example is emblematic of the racial attitudes
throughout the Caribbean and Latin America.42
As in the United States, the disparagement of
Black identity is not limited to Mulattos, Mestizos,
and Whites, but also extends to darker-skinned AfroLatinos who can harbor internalized racist norms.
The internalization manifests itself in a widespread
concern among Afro-Latinos with the degree of
pigmentation, width of nose, thickness of lips, and
nature of one’s hair -– with straight, European hair
denominated literally as “good” hair.

This concern

with European skin and features also influences AfroLatinos’ assessments of preferred marriage partners.
Marrying someone lighter is called “adelantando la
raza” (improving the race) under the theory of
“blanqueamiento” (whitening), which prizes the
mixture of races precisely to help diminish the
existence of Afro-Latinos.

Even in the midst of

Latin American nationalistic emphasis on having
individuals identify solely by their country of
origin rather than by racial ancestry, discursive
distinctions are made about the diminished value of
Blacks and blackness.

Indeed, it is even common

Really Really Black), in BLACKNESS
CARIBBEAN: SOCIAL DYNAMICS
EASTERN SOUTH AMERICA

AND

AND THE

IN

LATIN AMERICA

CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION,

AND THE
VOL.

II,

CARIBBEAN 285, 297 (Arlene

Torres & Norman E. Whitten, Jr. eds., 1998).
42

Ariel E. Dulitzky, A Region in Denial:

Racial

Discrimination and Racism in Latin America, in NEITHER
ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 41 - 42 (describing
the anti-Black racism that exists throughout Latin
America).
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within Latin America and the Caribbean to rank order
the prestige of countries based on a color spectrum
in which each country is racially identified.43

In

this way “nationality is a proxy for race” that
embodies White supremacy.44

As a result, countries

with a large percentage of Whites are valued while
those with a large percentage of Blacks are
discounted as “less cultured.”45

43

The attribution of a

Telephone Interview with Ana Y. Ramos Zayas,

Professor of Latino & Hispanic Caribbean Studies,
Rutgers Univ. (March 1, 2007); see also Francisco
Valdes, Race, Ethnicity, and Hispanismo in a
Triangular Perspective:

The “Essential Latino/a” and

LatCrit Theory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305, 326 (2000)
(describing the racialization of Latin America and
“the supremacy of whiteness and Eurocentricity in
Latina/o racial and ethnic hierarchies -– both in
Latin American societies and in Latina/o communities
throughout the United States”).

One scholar refers

to racial identification of countries as “primacism.”
See Benjamin G. Davis, International Commercial
Online and Offline Dispute Resolution: Addressing
Primacism and Universalism, 4 J. AM. ARB. 79, 81 (2005)
(“The word primacism is my manner of describing the
situation where race, culture, and nationality are
intertwined in such a manner that while one speaks in
terms of nationality, in fact, one is describing race
(or some other primary group).”).
44

Davis, supra note 43, at 81.

45

Hernández, Multiracial Matrix, supra note 37, at

1160 (“[T]he examination of the Latin American
context has shown how existing racial disparities and
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racial identity to countries, with nationality
serving as a proxy for race, also permits a
schizophrenic ability to cast racial aspersions about
a person’s background without ever openly discussing
race.

These proxies for race are deeply ingrained in

Latin American/Caribbean culture.46
It should not be surprising, then, that migrants
from Latin America and the Caribbean travel to the
United States with their culture of anti-Black racism
well intact.47

In turn, this facet of Latino culture

is transmitted to some degree to younger
generations.48

For instance, in one ethnographic

hierarchy are explained as the result of the ‘bad
culture’ that racial minorities manifest.”);

see

also Paulo de Carvalho-Neto, Folklore of the Black
Struggle in Latin America, 5 LATIN AM. PERSP. 53, 58 –
62, 71 (1978) (detailing the ways in which Latin
American folklore publicly depicts Blacks in Latin
America as ill mannered and stupid).

“To the

prejudiced white man, the black man has no artistic
or literary education.”
46

Id. at 62.

Telephone Interview with Ana Y. Ramos Zayas, supra

note 43.
47

Paula D. McClain et al., Racial Distancing in a

Southern City: Latino Immigrants’ Views of Black
Americans, 68 J. POL. 571 (2006) (documenting how
Latino immigrants bring negative attitudes towards
Blacks with them from their countries of origin
rather than develop them in the United States after
immigrating); Torres-Saillant, Problematic Paradigms,
supra note 30, at 435 - 55.
48

See Valdes, supra note 43, at 307 (observing the

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Hernández (CRCL)

01/26/09 9:45 AM

Page 30

study of Dominican racial identity within the United
States, all of the Dominican preoccupations with skin
color and European phenotype honed in the Dominican
Republic were readily apparent among the Dominican
Diaspora in the United States.49

Furthermore,

interviews of Dominican clients at a hair salon in
Washington Heights, New York, demonstrated the
pervasive Latin American/Caribbean racialized
denigration of curly African hair as “bad” and
straight European hair as “good,” along with the
distaste for dark skin.50
The inability to perceive Latino racism in the
United States stems from an acceptance in U.S. public
discourse of the Latin American myth that racism does
not exist in Latin America51 and that racism is thus
not part of the Latino migrant legacy across
generations.52

In turn, Latinos and the scholars who

describe their racial attitudes tend to accept the
notion that any anti-Black sentiment expressed by
Latinos in the United States is a consequence of
learning the cultural norms of the United States and
its racial paradigm.53

However, a growing social

“internal reproduction of white supremacy within and
among Latinas/os”).
49

See Ginetta E.B. Candelario, Situating Ambiguity:

Dominican Identity Formations 360 - 80 (2000)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of
New York) (on file with author).
50

Id. at 339.

51

Dulitzky, supra note 42, at 39.

52

See supra text accompanying note 30.

53

See, e.g., TATCHO MINDIOLA, JR.

ET AL.,

BLACK-BROWN
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science literature discredits the premise that Latino
racism is a set of behaviors and attitudes only
learned on the United States mainland.54

B. The Extent of Latino Social Distance from African
Americans

The sociological concept of “social distance”
measures the social unease that an ethnic or racial
group has in interactions with another ethnic or
racial group.55

Social science studies of Latino

racial attitudes often indicate a preference for
maintaining social distance from African Americans.
And while the social distance level is largest for
recent Latin American immigrants, more established
communities of Latinos in the United States are also
characterized by their social distance from African
Americans.

For instance, in a 2002 survey of 600

Latinos (two-thirds of whom were Mexican, the

RELATIONS
54

AND

STEREOTYPES 20 - 29, 37 - 38 (2002).

See Valdes, supra note 43, at 328 (“Latina/o

tendencies to valorize whiteness are not simply a
matter of acculturation, or even reacculturation, to
the Anglocentric white supremacist rule imposed by
the United States.”);

see also Tanya Katerí

Hernández, To Be Brown in Brazil: Education and
Segregation Latin American Style, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 683 (2005) (describing the literature
documenting the existence of residential and
educational racial segregation in Latin America).
55

GEORGE YANCEY, WHO

IS

WHITE? LATINOS, ASIANS,

AND THE

NEW

BLACK/NONBLACK DIVIDE 65 (2003).
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remainder Salvadorian and Colombian) and 600 African
Americans in Houston, Texas, the African Americans
had more positive views of Latinos than vice versa.56
While a slim majority of U.S. born Latinos did use
positive identifiers when describing African
Americans, only a minority of foreign-born Latinos
did so.

One typical foreign-born Latino respondent

stated “I just don’t trust them . . . .

The men,

especially, all use drugs and they all carry guns . .
. .”57

It is thus not surprising that this same study

found that, although Latino immigrants live in
residential neighborhoods with African Americans in
the same proportion as U.S.-born Latinos, 46% of
Latino immigrants report almost no interaction with
African Americans whatsoever.58

Similarly, the Los

Angeles Survey of Urban Inequality found that recent
and intermediate-term Latino immigrants held the most
negative stereotypes of African Americans.59
Furthermore, the social distance of Latinos from
African Americans is consistently reflected in Latino
responses to other survey questions.60

In a 2003

survey of five hundred residents of Durham, North
Carolina (equally divided among Latinos, African
Americans, and White-Anglos), researchers found that

56

MINDIOLA, JR., supra note 53, at 35.

57

Id. at 35.

58

Id. at 44 - 45.

59

CAMILLE ZUBRINSKY CHARLES, WON’T YOU BE MY NEIGHBOR? RACE,

CLASS,

AND

RESIDENCE

IN

LOS ANGELES 161 (2006) (describing

the results from the 1992 - 1994 Los Angeles Survey
of Urban Inequality).
60

Id. at 46.
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Latinos’ negative stereotypes of African Americans
exceed those held by White-Anglos.61

A 2000 study of

residential segregation found that Latinos reject
African Americans as neighbors more readily than
members of other racial groups do.62

In addition, the

1999 - 2000 Lilly Survey of American Attitudes and
Friendships indicated that African Americans were the
least desirable marriage partners for Latinos,
whereas African Americans are more accepting of
intermarriage with Latinos.63

61

See McClain, supra note 47 (observing that a

majority of Latino immigrants in the study -- 58.9% - said that few or almost no African Americans are
hardworking, 57% said few if any African Americans
could be trusted, and nearly one third said few if
any African Americans are easy to get along with; for
White-Anglos, 9.3% said few African Americans work
hard, 9.6% said African Americans could not be
trusted, and 8.4% said African Americans were
difficult to get along with).
62

Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Neighborhood Racial-

Composition Preferences: Evidence from a Multiethnic
Metropolis, 47 SOC. PROBS. 379 (2000).
63

YANCEY, supra note 55, at 70 - 71 (describing the

study of group-based racial attitudes but not
delineating which ethnic groups made up the composite
of “Latinos” in the study respondents);

see also

Roger Lindo, Miembros de las Diversas Razas Prefieren
a los Suyos:

Así lo Afirma una Investigación de la

Universidad de California de Los Angeles, LA OPINION,
Nov. 20, 1992, at 1C (describing UCLA study
indicating Latino social distance from African
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Similarly, in a 1993 study of inter-group
relations, Latinos overwhelmingly responded that they
had most in common with Whites and least in common
with African Americans.64

In contrast, African

Americans responded that they felt they had more in
common with Latinos and least in common with Whites
and Asian Americans.

It is somewhat ironic that

African Americans, who are publicly depicted as being
averse to coalition building with Latinos, provide
survey responses that are actually more in accord
with all the socioeconomic data that demonstrates the
commonality of African American and Latino
communities.65

Meanwhile, Latinos in

Americans); Cynthia Orosco, Aprender a Convivir:
Negros e Hispanos, LA OPINION, Apr. 14, 2001, at 9A
(describing a study by Hispanic Link regarding Latino
relations with African Americans in North Carolina,
South Carolina, Arkansas, Alabama, and Tennessee).
64

NAT’L CONFERENCE

THE FULL REPORT

FOR

OF THE

CMTY. JUSTICE, TAKING AMERICA’S PULSE:
NATIONAL CONFERENCE SURVEY

ON

INTER-GROUP

RELATIONS (1994).
65

See Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Too Black to be

Latino/a:” Blackness and Blacks as Foreigners in
Latino Studies, 1 LATINO STUD. 152, 154 (2003)
(“Current discussions about the demographic explosion
of Latinos/as and their desire to assume greater
political clout has focused upon the presumed
obstructionism and discontent of Anglo-Blacks who
must ‘relinquish’ their power to accommodate
Latinos/as.”);

see also Alex Prud’homme, Race

Relations Browns vs. Blacks, TIME, July 29, 1991, at
14 - 16 (identifying the source of Black-Latino
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contradistinction provide survey responses that fly
in the face of all the socioeconomic data
demonstrating African American and Latino parallels.66
Although some commentators might equate the
Latino preference for White-Anglos over African
Americans with the competition they perceive from
African Americans in the labor market, a 1996
sociological study of racial group competition
indicates otherwise.67

In the study of 477 Latinos

hostilities as African Americans’ beliefs that
“Latinos are benefiting from civil rights victories
won by blacks with little help from Hispanics,” “fear
that Hispanic immigrants, who are often willing to
work less than the legal minimum wage, are
supplanting them in even the lowliest positions,” and
resistance to “any attempts to increase Latino
employment” and being “unwilling to treat [Latinos]
as equals in the fight for equal rights”). A recent
book about Black-Latino hostilities has been
criticized for being one-sided in its blame of
African Americans: “The villains invariably turn out
to be African-Americans, who are threatened by
demographic changes and shut Latinos out of political
office, while refusing to acknowledge that anyone’s
suffering could ever be as great as theirs.” Ed
Morales, Brown Like Me?, THE NATION, Mar. 8, 2004, at
24.
66

BILL PIATT, BLACK

AND

BROWN

IN

AMERICA: THE CASE

FOR

COOPERATION 52 - 57 (1997) (detailing the socioeconomic
factors that align Latino and African American
interests).
67

Lawrence Bobo & Vincent L. Hutchings, Perceptions
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from the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey, Bobo
and Hutchings found that prejudice contributes to
perceptions of group threat and economic competition.
They also found that the greater the social distance
Latinos prefer to maintain from African Americans,
the more likely they are to see African Americans as
competitors.68

In other words, the anti-Black

animosity facilitates the perception of African
Americans as an economic threat.

Yet despite media

reports to the contrary, the Bobo and Hutchings study
indicated a lower rate of African American perception
of economic competition from Latinos, as compared
with the rate of Latino perception of economic threat
from African Americans.69

Similarly, Latinos

attribute disorder to predominantly African American
neighborhoods much more readily than do other
racial/ethnic groups.

A study published in 2004

demonstrated that neighborhood racial context in
Chicago shapes perceptions of disorder more
powerfully than actual observations of disorder.70
The Latino affinity for White-Anglos over
African Americans is part and parcel of the Latino

of Racial Group Competition:

Extending Blumer’s

Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social
Context, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 951 (1996).
68

Id. at 963.

69

Id. at 964.

70

Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing

Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social
Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q.
319, 332 – 33, 336 (2004) (summarizing findings of
study of five hundred block groups in Chicago).
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Indeed, in contrast

to the many reports of a Latino preference for mixedrace census racial categories, there is a strong
Latino preference for the White racial category and
some Latino groups like Cubans disproportionately
select the White racial category.71

Moreover, the

Latino National Political Survey, a study of Latino
racial preferences across generations in the United
States from 1989 to 1990, found that a substantial
majority of Latino respondents chose to self-identify
as White.72

It is important to note that the Latino

National Political Survey study was able to examine
the preference for whiteness divorced from any
ancillary effects that variation in census racial
category structures can include.73

71

The study

William Darity, Jr., Darrick Hamilton & Jason

Dietrich, Passing on Blackness: Latinos, Race and
Earnings in the USA, 9 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 847 (2002).
72

William Darity, Jr. & Tanya Golash Boza, Choosing

Race: Evidence from the Latino National Political
Survey 4 - 5 (2004), available at
http://paa2004.princeton.edu/download.asp?submissioni
d=41644 (discussing findings from study of Mexican
American, Cuban, and Puerto Rican respondents in the
United States); see also William A. Darity, Jr. et
al., Bleach in the Rainbow:

Latino Ethnicity and

Preference for Whiteness, 13 TRANSFORMING ANTHROPOLOGY 103
(2005).
73

A Hispanic–origin ethnicity category was not added

to the list of racial categories on the census until
1980.

See Transfer of Responsibility for Certain

Statistical Standards from OMB to Dep’t of Commerce,
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indicated that the White racial category is
particularly preferred by recent immigrants of all
skin color shades.74

And when later generations do

move away from the White racial category, they do so
in favor of collective national ethnic labels like
“Latino” or “Hispanic.”

75

Furthermore, the Latino

imagination consistently identifies a White face as
the quintessential Latino.76

Even for those Latinos

Directives for the Conduct of Federal Statistical
Activities, Directive 15, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,260, 19,269
(May 4, 1978).

This permitted Latinos to self-

identify both as of Hispanic origin and as belonging
to a racial category (Black, White, Asian, Indian, or
Other).

With the 1980 census Latino respondents

could self-select their racial and ethnic designation
rather than have one designated by a census
enumerator.

Prior to the 1980 census, enumerators

were instructed to observe and then classify
Hispanics who “were definitely not Negro” as White.
See Sharon M. Lee, Racial Classifications in the U.S.
Census: 1890 - 1990, 16 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 75, 78
(1993).

Mexicans were exempted from this White

versus Negro visual inspection when “Mexican” was
briefly included as its own racial category on the
1930 census.

Id.

From 1940 to 1970, Mexicans were

officially included in the White category.

Id.; see

also CLARA E. RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE: LATINOS,

CENSUS,

AND THE

HISTORY

OF

ETHNICITY

IN THE

THE

UNITED STATES (2000).

74

Darity & Boza, supra note 72, at 13.

75

Id.

76

Denise DiFulco, Can You Tell a Mexican from a

Puerto Rican?,

LATINA, Aug. 2003, at 86, 86.
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who do acknowledge their African ancestry, there is a
cultural pressure to emphasize their Latino ethnicity
publicly as a mechanism for distancing themselves
from public association with the denigrated societal
class of African Americans.77

This truism is

highlighted by the popular refrain “the darker the
skin, the louder the Spanish.”78
While commentators in the United States are
seemingly oblivious to the pre-existing anti-Black
racism of Latinos, journalists from abroad have
observed a number of disturbing examples.

For

instance, a 2001 British Broadcasting Company news
item entitled “Hate in Action” noted that Latino
gangs in Los Angeles have a clear mission of antiBlack ethnic cleansing in their neighborhoods and
that Latinos are increasingly perpetrators of antiBlack hate crimes in the United States.79

In fact,

four Latino gang members were recently convicted in
Los Angeles for engaging in a six-year conspiracy to
assault and murder African Americans in the city’s
Highland Park neighborhood.80

77

PATRICIA R. PESSAR, A VISA

FOR A

During the trial,

DREAM: DOMINICANS

IN THE

UNITED STATES 44 (1995).
78

DAVID HOWARD, COLORING

THE

NATION: RACE

AND

ETHNICITY

IN THE

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 114 - 15 (2001).
79

Pilar Marrero, El Odio en Acción, BBCMUNDO.COM, Aug.

29, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/newsid_1513
000/1513820.stm.
80

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Gang Members

Convicted of Federal Hate Crimes for Murders and
Assaults of African-Americans (Aug. 1, 2006),
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federal prosecutors demonstrated that African
American residents were terrorized in an effort to
force them out of a neighborhood perceived as
Latino.81

Notably, the victims of the violence were

not themselves members of gangs.

One African

American resident was murdered as he looked for a
parking space.82

As a consequence of the incendiary

facts, the trial garnered some media attention and is
thus an exception to the general public silence about
Latino expressions of anti-Black bias in the United
States.83
The one area in which Latino anti-Black racism
has begun to be discussed in the United States is

available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_crt_481.ht
ml.
81

See John Spano, Blacks Were Targeted, Witness

Insists:

A Highland Park Gang Member Testifies in a

Civil Rights Conspiracy Trial That a 1999 Murder Was
Part of a Racial Cleansing Campaign, L.A. TIMES, July
6, 2006, at B4.
82

See Andrew Murr, A Gang War with a Twist:

Gangbangers in L.A. on Trial for Deadly Hate Crimes,
NEWSWEEK, July 17, 2006, at 29.
83

See Tanya K. Hernández, Op-Ed., Roots of

Latino/Black Anger: Longtime Prejudices, Not Economic
Rivalry, Fuel Tensions, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, at M1
(discussing the growing pattern of Latino gangs
targeting peaceful, non-gang-affiliated Black
residents in Los Angeles, culminating in the murder
of fourteen-year-old Cheryl Green on December 15,
2006).
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with respect to the apparent racial caste system of
Spanish-language television that presents Latinos as
almost exclusively White.84

In fact, because of the

scarce but derogatory images of Afro-Latinos in the
media, activists have been lobbying the Puerto Rican
Legal Defense and Education Fund to consider a
lawsuit against the two major Spanish-language
networks to challenge their depiction of AfroLatinos.85

Some Latino activists see a direct

parallel between the whiteness of Spanish-language
television and Latino politics.

One such activist

states:
Latino leaders and organizations do not
want to acknowledge that racism exists
among our people, so they have ignored the
issue by subscribing to a national origin
strategy. This strategy identifies Latinos
as a group comprising different
nationalities, thereby creating the false
impression that Latinos live in a colorblind society.86
Many concrete examples demonstrate that Latinos
are not colorblind.

To begin with, Afro-Latinos in

the United States experience color discrimination at
the hands of other Latinos.

In fact, the 2002

National Survey of Latinos indicated that Latinos
with more pronounced African ancestry, such as
Dominicans, more readily cite color discrimination as

84

Michael A. Fletcher, The Blond, Blue-Eyed Face of

Spanish TV, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2000, at A01.
85

Carlos Flores, Race Discrimination Within the

Latino Community, DIÁLOGO, Winter/Spring 2001, at 30 –
31, available at
http://condor.depaul.edu/~dialogo/back_issues/issue_5
/race_discrimination.htm.
86

Id.
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an explanation for the bias they experience from
other Latinos.87

Furthermore, despite variations

across regions and ethnic groups, the commonality of
social distance in relations with African Americans
remains constant.

What follows is a preliminary

review of the social science literature that
demonstrates the consistency of anti-Black sentiment
in Latino communities across the United States.

C. Racial Attitudes Among Latinos Across Ethnic
Groups and Regions

Of all the Latino ethnic subgroups, Mexican
Americans have the largest demographic presence
within the United States.88

The development of

87

PEW HISPANIC CTR. & THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY

OF

LATINOS 74 (2002), available at

http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/15.pdf.
88

The 2000 census reported that of the 35.3 million

Latinos in the United States, 58% were of Mexican or
Mexican American origin.

See Press Release, U.S.

Census Bureau, Census 2000 Paints Statistical
Portrait of the Nation's Hispanic Population (May 10,
2001), available at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/2001/cb01-81.html.

This large

demographic presence represents not only contemporary
immigration flows from Mexico, but also the
generations of Mexican Americans who trace their
roots to the incorporation of Mexican lands into the
United States after the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican American War.
RICHARD GRISWOLD

DEL

CASTILLO, THE TREATY

OF

See

GUADALUPE HIDALGO: A

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36

Hernández (CRCL)

01/26/09 9:45 AM

Page 43

Mexican American racial identity in the United States
has been subject to a variety of influences.

Prior

to the Chicano movement, Mexican American leaders
claimed that Mexicans were Caucasian and therefore
deserving of the same social status as White-Anglos.89
“The Mexican American generation saw themselves as a
White group,” writes Professor Ian Haney Lopez.
“This self-conception both drew upon and led to
prejudice against African Americans, which in turn
hindered direct relations between those two groups.”90
Only after widespread police brutality and judicial

LEGACY

OF

CONFLICT (1990); THE MEXICAN WAR: A CRISIS

FOR

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Archie P. McDonald ed., 1969).
89

Ruben Salazar, the Los Angeles Times journalist who

most faithfully reported the developments of the
Chicano movement, observed that “many [Mexican
Americans] still cling to the idea that Mexican
Americans are Caucasians, thus white, thus ‘one of
the boys.’”

Ruben Salazar, Chicanos Would Find

Identity Before Coalition With Blacks, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1979, reprinted in BORDER CORRESPONDENT: SELECTED
WRITINGS, 1955 - 1970, at 239, 241 (Mario T. Garcia ed.,
1995).

In addition, Salazar observed that “several

of the more conservative Mexican-American leaders
strongly oppose any ‘mixing’ of Mexican-American and
Negro grievances.”

Ruben Salazar, Negro Drive

Worries Mexican-Americans, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1963,
reprinted in BORDER CORRESPONDENT: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1955 1970, at 113, 113
90

(Mario T. Garcia ed., 1995).

Ian Haney Lopez, Protest, Repression, and Race:

Legal Violence and the Chicano Movement, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 205, 216 (2001).

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Hernández (CRCL)

01/26/09 9:45 AM

Page 44

mistreatment of Mexicans in the wake of the Black
civil rights movement did a Chicano movement that
stressed a non-White Chicano identity emerge.91

Yet

this non-White identity focused upon Chicanos’
indigenous ancestry and completely submerged their
African ancestry.92
Even with their construction of a non-White
racial identification, Chicanos in California and the
Southwest in the 1960s and 1970s expressed feelings
of cultural superiority with respect to African
Americans that adversely affected inter-group
interactions.93

At the time, one Chicano college

student summed up this sentiment when he wrote:
We’re not like the Negroes. They want to
be white men because they have no history
to be proud of. My ancestors come from one
of the most civilized nations in the
world.94
Such sentiments in turn fed Chicano resentment about
the allocation of government funds in Los Angeles
after the 1965 Watts urban uprising, and the
allocation of government funds to service agencies
catering to what were described to be as “less needy”
African Americans.95

Such perspectives have not

91

Id.

92

Tanya Katerí Hernández, Afro-Mexicans and the

Chicano Movement: The Unknown Story, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1537 (2004) (reviewing IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM
THE CHICANO FIGHT
93

FOR

ON

TRIAL:

JUSTICE (2003)).

FRED BARBARO, Ethnic Resentment, in BLACK/BROWN/WHITE

RELATIONS: RACE RELATIONS

IN THE

1970S 77, 89 - 91 (Charles

V. Willie ed., 1977).
94

Id. at 91.

95

Id. at 90.
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greatly changed in the new millennium.

In Los

Angeles, where a predominant number of Latinos are
Chicano, it has been observed:
Many Latinos fail to understand the
complexity and severity of the black
experience. They frequently bash blacks
for their poverty and goad them to pull
themselves up like other immigrants have
done. Worse, some even repeat the same
vicious anti-black epithets used by racist
whites.96
For instance, in the 2000 New York Times series
entitled “How Race is Lived in America,” an
investigation into the North Carolina pork industry
revealed a rigidly planned hierarchy in job tasks
assigned by race that usually had White-Anglos
employed as supervisors over both African Americans
and Latinos.97

Yet rather than focusing on the

injustice of all-White management ranks, Mexican
worker Mrs. Fernandez is quoted as saying, “Blacks
don’t want to work.

They’re lazy.”98

Her husband is

quoted as saying, “I hate the Blacks.”99

Even Mexican

Americans with greater exposure to the U.S. history
of racism express cultural superiority over African
Americans.

One prominent Mexican American business

executive and commentator in Los Angeles, Fernando
Oaxaca, accounts for the difference in Latino and
African American economic conditions with the

96

Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Urban Tension: Latinos’ New

Clout Threatening to Blacks, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 26,
2003, at V3.
97

Charlie LeDuff, At a Slaughterhouse, Some Things

Never Die: Who Kills, Who Cuts, Who Bosses Can Depend
on Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2000, at A1.
98

Id.

99

Id.
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explanation, “[W]e have a work ethic.”100
Even younger generations are not immune to antiBlack sentiment.

In recent years the Los Angeles

town of Inglewood has experienced violence almost
every time Black History Month is celebrated.101

The

source of the violence is Latino teens’ resentment at
the month-long celebration of Black culture.

In

February 1999, the principal of Inglewood High School
cancelled the Black History Month celebration in
order to avoid the violence.102
Los Angeles Latinos have even proposed having
block association meetings that exclude the African
American residents of the block, prompting one
African American resident to state, “[I]t seems like
the Latinos don’t even want to try to forge
neighborhood unity.”

103

This social distance is

paralleled even in church congregations in which
Latino and African American parishioners who share
the same church attend separate services, serve on
separate parish councils, and never meet.104

It is

interesting to note that even when African American
congregations in other areas of the United States
have actively made it part of their ministry to reach

100

Gary Lee & Robert Suro, Latino-Black Rivalry

Grows: Los Angeles Reflects Tensions Between
Minorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1993, at A01.
101

Martin Kasindorf & Maria Puente, Hispanics and

Blacks Find Their Futures Entangled, USA TODAY, Sept.
10, 1999, at 21A.
102

Id.

103

Lee & Suro, supra note 100, at A01.

104

Lee & Suro, supra note 100, at A01.
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out to their Latino neighbors, the social distance of
Latinos remains.105

Ethnographic studies of Mexican

Americans in Chicago and the southern states uncover
the same disdain for African Americans and
attributions of blackness in Latino subgroups.106

For

example, one Latino student at a Chicago high school
said: “It’s crazy.

But a lot of the Hispanic kids

here just don’t want to be friends with the
blacks.”107
The general racial relations of Cubans with
African Americans in Florida are not much better.

In

fact, Miami, Florida (a city in which Cubans and
other Latinos predominate and hold political power),
has the distinction of being the only city that was

105

Francis W. Guidry, Reaching The People Across the

Street:

An African American Church Reaches Out To

Its Hispanic Neighbors (1997) (unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, Drew University Theological School) (on
file with author).
106

See NICHOLAS DE GENOVA & ANA Y. RAMOS-ZAYAS, LATINO

CROSSINGS: MEXICANS, PUERTO RICANS,

AND THE

POLITICS

OF

RACE

AND

CITIZENSHIP 187 - 89 (2003) (discussing ethnographic
study of Latino racial attitudes in Chicago); McClain
et al., supra note 47 (discussing study of Latino
immigrant views of Blacks in the U.S. South);

see

also Rachel L. Swarns, Bridging a Racial Rift That
Isn’t Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2006, at A1
(describing derogatory racial attitudes of Mexican
workers in the U.S. South toward African Americans).
107

Jacquelyn Heard, Racial Strife Runs Deep at High

School: Black and Hispanic Staff, Students Clash at
Farragut, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1992, at 1C.
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the locus of four separate race riots in the 1980s.108
The immediate causes of all four riots were police
shootings of African Americans.109

Although police

brutality against African Americans is endemic
throughout the United States, Miami is a city with
many Latino police officers and, more alarmingly, a
Latino population seemingly indifferent to anti-Black
police brutality.

For instance, when a Colombian

immigrant police officer was found guilty of
manslaughter for killing an African American
motorcyclist, the Latino community came out in
protest.110

Furthermore, Latinos publicly denounced

the urban uprisings that marked each affront to the
humanity of African Americans as the work of the
“criminal element.”

111

Indeed, sociologists in Miami

have noted that the Latino discourse about African
Americans evinces the association of African
Americans with crime and “an invidious comparison
between Hispanic economic advancement--attributed to
hard work, family values, and self-reliance--and
black dependency on welfare and other social

108

Marvin Dunn & Alex Stepick III, Blacks in Miami,

in MIAMI NOW! IMMIGRATION, ETHNICITY,

AND

SOCIAL CHANGE 41

(Guillermo J. Grenier & Alex Stepick III eds., 1992).
109

Id.

110

Id. at 45.

111

John F. Stack & Christopher L. Warren, The Reform

Tradition and Ethnic Politics: Metropolitan Miami
Confronts the 1990s, in MIAMI NOW! IMMIGRATION, ETHNICITY,
AND

SOCIAL CHANGE 174 (Guillermo J. Grenier & Alex

Stepick III eds., 1992).
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programs.”112
In contrast, studies of Puerto Rican relations
with African Americans in the northeastern United
States have traditionally noted the smaller degree of
social distance that exists between the groups.113
However, even the Puerto Rican subgroup expresses
anti-Black racism.

Angela Jorge noted early on that

Latinos such as Puerto Ricans are taught within their
family circles to dislike African Americans.114

One

observer of the civil rights coalitions of Puerto
Ricans and African Americans even stated that the
coalition “was more of a strategic device than a
factual description of the true nature of the
relationship between the groups.

Puerto Rican

participation in civil rights organizations and on
picket lines was lower than for whites.”115

Another

commentator noted that Puerto Ricans, because of the
anti-Black prejudice they harbored, were not eager to

112

Guillermo J. Grenier & Max Castro, Blacks and

Cubans in Miami: The Negative Consequences of the
Cuban Enclave on Ethnic Relations, in GOVERNING AMERICAN
CITIES: INTERETHNIC COALITIONS, COMPETITION,

AND

CONFLICT, 137,

151 (Michael Jones-Correa ed., 2001).
113

See Nelson Peery, Witnessing History: An

Octogenarian Reflects on Fifty Years of African
American-Latino Relations, in NEITHER ENEMIES

NOR

FRIENDS,

supra note 4, at 305, 306 - 08.
114

Angela Jorge, The Black Puerto Rican Woman in

Contemporary American Society, in THE PUERTO RICAN WOMAN
134, 139 (Edna Acosta-Belén ed., 1979).
115

BARBARO, supra note 93, at 83.
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be identified with African Americans.116

In fact, the

residential segregation between the two groups is
high.117

Even though Puerto Rican youth organizations

in the 1960s and 1970s modeled themselves after the
Black Panthers, the groups never had much contact
with Black Power organizations.118
In fact, although relations between Puerto
Ricans and African Americans in New York City are
typically depicted as unusually harmonious, electoral
politics studies have shown the two groups at odds
with one another.119

Similarly, in Chicago, racial

tensions between Puerto Ricans and African Americans
have arisen over the competition for housing
rehabilitation, in which Puerto Ricans have depicted
African Americans as presumed gang members,
criminals, and generally the cause of the tightening

116

José E. Cruz, Interminority Relations in Urban

Settings:

Lessons from the Black-Puerto Rican

Experience, in BLACK

AND

MULTIRACIAL POLITICS

IN

AMERICA 84,

90 (Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh & Lawrence J. Hanks eds.,
2000).
117

Id. at 91.

118

Id. at 92; see also MIGUEL “MICKEY” MELENDEZ, WE TOOK

STREETS: FIGHTING

FOR

LATINO RIGHTS

WITH THE

THE

YOUNG LORDS

(2003).
119

Angelo Falcón, Black and Latino Politics in New

York City: Race and Ethnicity in a Changing Urban
Context, in LATINOS

AND THE

POLITICAL SYSTEM 171 (F. Chris

Garcia ed., 1988); Silvio Torres-Saillant, Racism in
the Americas and the Latino Scholar, in NEITHER ENEMIES
NOR

FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 281, 299.
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housing market.120
The concern with a racialized competition
between Latinos and African Americans does not
dissipate when one examines Dominicans, who are
frequently viewed as Black themselves.121

Despite

often sharing the more visible facial imprint of
African ancestry, Dominicans and African Americans
have a high level of residential segregation,122 and
Dominicans resent job competition from African
Americans.123

Recent reports of high-school violence

show Dominican youth and African American youth
involved in violent clashes as well.124

120

OF

Yet despite

See ANA Y. RAMOS-ZAYAS, NATIONAL PERFORMANCES: THE POLITICS
CLASS, RACE,

AND

SPACE

IN

PUERTO RICAN CHICAGO 228 - 30

(2003).
121

Jose Itzigsohn et al., Immigrant Incorporation and

Racial Identity: Racial Self-Identification Among
Dominican Immigrants, 28 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 50, 69
(2005) (describing high levels of Black external
racialization of Dominicans in New York and their
high level of Black self-identification).
122

Lance Freeman, A Note on the Influence of African

Heritage on Segregation: The Case of Dominicans, 35
URB. AFF. 137, 141 (1999).
123

Jose Itzigsohn & Carlos Dore-Cabral, Competing

Identities?

Race, Ethnicity and Panethnicity Among

Dominicans in the United States, 15 SOC. F. 225, 240
(2000).
124

See Russell, supra note 15 (reporting the

harassment of African American athletes by a
Dominican gang of students known as the “D Block” in
Perth Amboy, New Jersey).

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Hernández (CRCL)

01/26/09 9:45 AM

Page 52

the troublesome incidents demonstrating discord
between Latinos and African Americans and the
complexity of Latino racial attitudes, the emerging
Latino inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases
often treat Latinos as incapable of racial or ethnic
discrimination.

II. THE EMERGING LATINO INTER-ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION CASES

The majority of the emerging cases of Latino
inter-ethnic discrimination are disparate treatment
claims filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.125

125

This accords with the majority

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000).

A list of the

relevant cases presently available in LexisNexis and
Westlaw follows.

Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., 336

F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2003) (African American plaintiff
alleging that Hispanic supervisor treated Hispanic
employees better and gave her more onerous
responsibilities); Osei-Buckle v. Laidlaw Transit,
Inc., No. CV-96-00753-DDP, 1998 WL 552126, at *1 (9th
Cir. Aug. 27, 1998) (African American plaintiff
alleging Hispanic supervisor discriminated against
her and expressed preference for Hispanic employees
in allocating work assignments); Patino v. Rucker,
No. 96-7531, 1997 WL 416949, at *1 (2d Cir. July 25,
1997) (Puerto Rican porter for Columbia University
alleging that he was discharged by his Hispanic
supervisor and replaced with another Latino porter,
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act);
Arrocha v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. CV021868, 2004 WL
594981, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004) (Afro-
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Panamanian college instructor alleging illegal
termination in preference for non-Black Hispanic
employees); Isaac v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County,
No. 00-0890-CIV, 2002 WL 31086118, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 3, 2002) (African American plaintiff alleging
discrimination by Hispanic supervisor); Allen v.
Bake-Line Prods., Inc., No. 98 C 1119, 2001 WL
1249054, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2001) (analyzing
allegation by fifteen African American plaintiffs
that Hispanic management preferred Hispanic employees
and failed to promote African American employees to
position of supervisor as an individual disparate
treatment case because the statistical data presented
by plaintiff was insufficient to mount a systemic
case); Rai v. Dynagear, Inc., No.98 C 6053, 2000 WL
875401, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2000) (Southeast
Asian Indian plaintiff alleging discriminatory
termination by Hispanic supervisor and other Hispanic
managers who preferred to work with Mexicans and not
Indians); Olumuyiwa v. Harvard Prot. Corp., No. 98CV-5110, 1999 WL 529553, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 21,
1999) (Nigerian plaintiff alleging that Hispanic and
Yugoslavian employees were hired at a higher wage and
received greater number of work hours than Black
employees); Rodriguez v. Torres, 60 F. Supp. 2d 334
(D.N.J. 1999) (Hispanic plaintiff alleging that
Hispanic supervisor denied him a promotion and
subjected him to a hostile work environment because
of his involvement in Hispanic community activism);
Russell v. Am. Eagle Airlines, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1330
(S.D. Fla. 1999) (African American aircraft mechanic
alleging that employees and supervisors who were
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either White or Hispanic racially harassed him);
Thompson v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees,
No. 97 C 1172, 1999 WL 258488, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
13, 1999) (African American plaintiff alleging
discriminatory termination and replacement by
Hispanic candidate along with preferential treatment
for Hispanic employees); Harper v. Hunter Coll., No.
95 CIV. 10388, 1999 WL 147698, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
15, 1999) (West Indian assistant principal custodial
supervisor alleging that his Hispanic immediate
supervisor and Black American director of
housekeeping subjected him to harassment,
retaliation, and termination); Sprott v. Franco, No.
94 Civ. 3818, 1998 WL 472061, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,
1998) (African American who worked as Deputy Director
of New York City Housing Authority Office of Equal
Opportunity alleged that her Hispanic supervisor
harassed her and denied her salary increases because
of her race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981);
Vincent v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., Inc. of Fla., 3
F. Supp. 2d 1405 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (Black, Haitianborn security guard alleged that Black and Haitian
guards were assigned undesirable posts while Whites
and Hispanics were given desirable posts with rest
rooms); Webb v. R&B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (African American title clerk
alleging discrimination in a predominantly CaucasianHispanic car dealership); Bernard v. N.Y. City Health
& Hosps. Corp., No. 93 CIV.8593, 1996 WL 457284
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1996) (pro se application by a
self-described dark-skinned Black woman born in
Trinidad, West Indies alleging that she had been
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terminated from her position as Administrative
Assistant because of her race, color, and national
origin, all in violation of Title VII, because of
negative interactions with her Puerto Rican manager
and other Latina co-workers); Mathura v. Council for
Human Servs. Home Care Servs., Inc., No. 95CIV.4191,
1996 WL 157496 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1996) (Black
Belizean plaintiff alleging that Hispanic supervisor
harassed and verbally abused him and treated him
differently from the Hispanic employees); Roberts v.
CBS Broadcasting Inc., No. BC 227280, 2003 WL
1194102, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2003) (African
American camera technician alleging Hispanic
supervisor relegated him to temporary job positions
and routinely passed him over in favor of non-African
Americans with less seniority, experience or
expertise who were often preselected when openings
were not posted).
The number of emerging cases has thus far been
modest, in large measure because of the racially
segmented nature of the employment market, which
relegates different racial and ethnic groups to
different employment sectors and job positions.
HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR
WORK,

AND THE

AND THE

See

AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE,

LAW 182 - 83, 254 (Univ. Wis. Press 1985)

(1977) (providing statistical data regarding the
racial segmentation of the labor market); DEIRDRE A.
ROYSTER, RACE
BLACK MEN

FROM

AND THE

INVISIBLE HAND: HOW WHITE NETWORKS EXCLUDE

BLUE-COLLAR JOBS 29 - 33 (2003) (explaining

the dynamic of labor market racial segmentation and
how the operation of ethnic networks facilitates
racial hierarchy); Elizabeth Higginbotham, Employment
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of employment discrimination claims that are filed by
individual plaintiffs asserting disparate treatment
rather than class claims of systemic disparate
treatment or disparate impact.126

Accordingly, this

for Professional Black Women in the Twentieth
Century, in INGREDIENTS

FOR

WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT POLICY 73 - 91

(Christine Bose & Glenna Spitze eds., 1987)
(detailing how even when Blacks enter into
traditionally segregated professions, they are
relegated to racially segregated positions).

It is

the longstanding existence of racial segmentation
that in turn can fuel racial hostilities when
different racial and ethnic groups interact in the
workplace.

See, e.g., Roberto Lovato, The

Latinization of New Orleans, NEW AM. MEDIA, Oct. 18,
2005,
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.htm
l?article_id=fa92e2c88a63985418da75582292b5c7
(describing the influx of Latino workers as a
“radical Latinization that is transforming [New
Orleans and] other urban landscapes in the country”
and that has “strained race relations by lowering
wages and fostering competition between groups”).
126

See THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION 83 (2001) (describing the different
stages of proof in a class-based systemic disparate
treatment case alleging that an employer’s hiring or
promotion practice results in the hiring or promotion
of fewer members of a protected group in relation to
the number of qualified group members in the local
labor pool); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW:
VISIONS

OF

EQUALITY

IN

THEORY

AND

DOCTRINE 70 - 87 (2001)
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Article’s examination of Latino inter-ethnic
employment discrimination focuses on individual
disparate treatment claims.

A. Doctrinal Contours of Disparate Treatment

In an individual disparate treatment case, an
employer may not, with a rule, policy, or decision,
treat an employee differently than she treats other
employees on account of race or ethnicity.127

The

plaintiff must prove that the employer purposefully
treated her differently compared to similarly
situated individuals from other racial or ethnic
groups.

Yet absent direct evidence of discriminatory

motive128 (for example, outright statements of animus

(describing the doctrinal features of an adverse
impact case in which a business policy or practice
affects a plaintiff’s protected group as a class
differently than it affects members of other groups);
John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing
Nature of Employment Discrimination, 43 STAN. L. REV.
983, 1019 - 21 (1991) (detailing the numerical
patterns in kinds of cases filed).
127

See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 126, at 30 - 54

(describing the features of an individual disparate
treatment case, which can also be based upon color,
national origin, gender, or religion).
128

In a situation where the employer is alleged to

have both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory
motives for the employment decision, known as a
mixed-motive case, a plaintiff who can establish that
discrimination played a “motivating factor” in the
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closely timed with an adverse employment decision), a
plaintiff can rely upon circumstantial evidence.
This is done with an elaborate burden-shifting
process.129

employer’s decision is entitled to judgment.
Thereafter the defendant is allowed to prove that she
would have made the same decision absent the
discriminatory motive, and if the defendant is
successful the plaintiff is not entitled to any
compensatory relief on her claim; she can still
collect attorney’s fees for prevailing on the merits,
and can possibly obtain injunctive relief.

See

Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
129

See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 802 (1973).

A plaintiff can establish a prima

facie inference of discrimination by showing that she
is a member of a protected group (race, sex, etc.)
and was rejected after applying for a job or
promotion for which he or she was qualified, and that
after rejecting the plaintiff the employer continued
to seek applications from persons of plaintiff’s
qualifications.

The employer can rebut the prima

facie showing of discrimination by proffering a
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.
Thereafter the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
present either further evidence of discriminatory
intent or evidence that the defendant’s proffered
nondiscriminatory justification was actually a
pretext for discrimination.

The elements of the

prima facie case may be modified to suit varying
factual patterns beyond the hiring and promotion
context.

But it is not sufficient for a plaintiff
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merely to show that the employer’s proffer of a
nondiscriminatory reason was “unbelievable.” See
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133 (2000);
see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993).

Scholars have observed that over time,

courts have transformed the burden-shifting process
into one that is more burdensome on plaintiffs than
originally intended by McDonnell Douglas.

See, e.g.,

Symposium, Employment Discrimination and the Problems
of Proof, 61 LA. L. REV. 487 (2001).

It is also

unclear whether the Supreme Court decision in Desert
Palace has altered the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
standard.

See MARION G. CRAIN

ET AL.,

WORKLAW: CASES

AND

MATERIALS 560 (2005) (“Although, on its face, the
Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Desert Palace
was uncontroversial, it has sparked a lively debate
in the lower courts (so far principally confined to
district courts) regarding whether the case has
altered the McDonnell Douglas proof structure.”); see
also id. at 560 (“Traditionally, the mixed-motives
structure was seen as an alternative proof structure.
. . . But now that the Supreme Court has held that
circumstantial evidence can be used to prove a mixedmotive case, there is a question whether the two
structures have effectively been merged, given that
circumstantial evidence is the means to prove
pretext.”); Sheila A. Skojec, Effect of Mixed or Dual
Motives in Actions Under Title VII, 83 A.L.R. FED. 268
(listing cases that apply Desert Palace differently).
But see Ash v. Tyson Foods, 546 U.S. 454 (2006) (per
curiam) (chastising the Eleventh Circuit for its
inappropriate test once pretext is shown and thereby
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In the absence of evidence of overt
discriminatory treatment, the plaintiff may offer
statistical data about the composition of the
workforce in comparison to the number of racial
minorities in the relevant labor market to allow the
court to infer discrimination.130

Ironically, this

ability to infer discrimination from racial disparity
in the workplace can lead fact-finders in interethnic discrimination cases to conclude that diverse
workplaces are free of discrimination.

The juridical

belief in the inherent salutary powers of a diverse
workplace exists despite established Supreme Court
precedent to the contrary.

In fact, the Supreme

Court has rejected the notion that a workplace with a
large number of employees from a plaintiff’s
protected group is de facto free of bias against the
plaintiff.131

However, the emerging inter-ethnic

suggesting that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
test remains separate from the Price Waterhouse
mixed-motive test).
130

See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 - 05

(noting that statistical evidence showing an
employer’s general policy or practice is relevant to
whether an individual employment decision was
discriminatory).
131

See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.

542 (1971) (per curiam) (vacating summary judgment in
a sex discrimination case in which the district court
erroneously concluded that an over-representation of
women in the workplace obviated the existence of bias
against women by an employer that refused to accept
job applications from women with preschool-age
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discrimination cases suggest that judges are
doctrinal amnesiacs when caught up in the
romanticization of diversity.

B. The Diversity Defense and Its Obfuscation

The diversity defense describes the way in which
legal actors immediately view a racially “diverse”
workplace as the equivalent of a racially harmonious
workplace.132

These legal actors view people of color

children).
132

It should be noted that more than a decade ago

Juan Perea presciently suggested that employers would
be able to defend themselves against a claim of
national-origin discrimination by the presentation of
workplace statistics indicating a large percentage of
racial minorities.

See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and

Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin”
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
805, 864 - 65 (1994) (describing the potential for an
employer’s “minority percentage points defense” to
national origin discrimination claims).

Yet the two

cases available to Perea at that time did not
explicitly deploy racial minority percentages data as
the justification for denying relief to the
plaintiffs, as is done in the Latino inter-ethnic
discrimination cases discussed herein.

See Espinoza

v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93 (1973) (finding no
evidence of national-origin discrimination when there
was no disparity in Latino hiring and the only direct
evidence was employer’s neutrally applied policy
against hiring undocumented workers); Garcia v.
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as the same, overlooking the particular histories and
present incidence of racial animus within and across
different ethnic groups.133

The judicial fashioning

Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding
that in the absence of both direct evidence of
national origin discrimination and an indirect
suggestion of discrimination from a workplace
statistical imbalance in the hiring of Latinos, the
neutral application of a workplace English-only rule
was not national-origin discrimination).
133

The colorblind approach of the diversity defense

is not exclusive to judges of any particular race.
Cf. Martin Kilson, Anatomy of Black Conservatism, 59
TRANSITION 4, 7 (1993) (describing the articulation of
colorblind discourse amongst Black intellectuals).
The one exception to the judicial use of the
diversity defense that appears in the emerging interethnic discrimination cases is in the context of
White plaintiffs filing reverse-discrimination
allegations in diverse non-White workplace settings.
This is the only context where the diverse workplace
does not mislead judges into automatically presuming
the existence of a bias-free workplace.

See Bass v.

Bd. of County Comm’rs, 256 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir. 2001)
(reversing summary judgment order for defendant where
White plaintiff alleged discrimination in layoff
decision from racially diverse workplace); EEOC v.
David Gomez & Assocs., Inc., 1997 WL 136285 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 17, 1997) (denying summary judgment where
White plaintiff alleged discrimination because he was
not referred for employment by agency that chose to
refer Latino and African American candidates
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of a diversity defense to claims of employment
discrimination appears to reflect the public
romanticization of diversity as a panacea for racial
conflict.134

Diversity as a concept was first

introduced into the legal discourse as a
justification for race-conscious remedies to racial
inequality, such as affirmative action.135

Since that

time, it has taken on a force of its own in the
public imagination136 through the operation of what

instead).
134

See Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Multiracial”

Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of ColorBlind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 102 (1998)
(observing the growing societal belief that racial
diversity will deconstruct and transcend race and
racism);

see also Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content

of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 53, 106
(1999) (discussing the growing scholarship that
equates increasing racial diversity with the
reconstruction of racism and the Black-White paradigm
of race).
135

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438

U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring);

see

also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(holding the use of racial preferences to enroll a
critical mass of underrepresented students of color
legally permissible to serve the compelling interests
of achieving a diverse and robust exchange of ideas
and developing leaders from various racial
communities).
136

See Lana Bortolot, Group Dynamics: Companies

Embrace Diversity, Teach Employees Respect, AM NEW
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sociologist Lauren Edelman aptly terms “diversity
rhetoric.”137

Research corroborates the public

YORK, Mar. 6, 2006, at 33, available at
http://www.amNY.com/careers (“Remember when ‘synergy’
was the buzzword a few years ago? Well, get ready for
a new one.

Diversity is what’s hot now.”); Myron

Curry, Diversity:

No Longer Just Black and White,

BLACK EOE J., Spring 2005, at 46, 46 (“Most CEO’s and
executives alike have come to discover that diversity
is what often makes for better business.”); Chris
Woodyard, Multilingual Staff Can Drive up Auto Sales;
Ethnic Communities Show Buying Power, USA TODAY, Feb.
22, 2005, at B1 (reporting that businesses all over
the country are realizing that being multicultural
has profit benefits);

see also Peter H. Schuck, The

Perceived Values of Diversity, Then and Now, 22 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1915, 1937 - 38 (2001) (“Nor is diversity
merely a widespread ideal among social and
educational elites; it is now an explicit public
policy goal emphatically endorsed by both major
parties and opposed by none . . . .”).

But see

Orlando Patterson, On the Provenance of Diversity, 23
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 51, 61 (2005) (“What is true of the
private sector has been true of society and the
economy at large.

The focus has shifted from

addressing the very special problems of African
Americans to the promotion of a feel-good, but
largely empty, goal of ethnic diversity.”).
137

Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and

the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589
(2001) (discussing employers’ “diversity rhetoric”
and expansion of the legal concept of diversity to
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support for diversity and indicates that diverse
workplaces help to facilitate creative problem
solving, attract larger client bases, and effectively
operate within a global marketplace.138
However, the mere presence of coworkers from
various backgrounds in a single workplace does not
magically foster racial harmony.

Indeed, the

research regarding diverse work teams indicates that
employers need to cultivate particular conditions in
order to generate effective work teams of diverse
backgrounds.139

Otherwise, racial conflict and poor

social relations can continue to exist even within

nonlegal dimensions).
138

See DIVERSITY

IN

WORK TEAMS: RESEARCH PARADIGMS

FOR A

CHANGING WORKPLACE (Susan E. Jackson & Marian N. Ruderman
eds., 1995);

see also CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER:

HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN

A

DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003)

(discussing the importance of workplace bonds to
enhancing inter-group relations); Steven A. Ramirez,
Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85
(2000) (summarizing literature demonstrating the
business benefits of a diverse workforce); David B.
Wilkins, From “Separate is Inherently Unequal” to
“Diversity is Good for Business”: The Rise of MarketBased Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1556 (2004).
139

See Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural

Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity
Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229 (2001) (concluding that diverse work
teams function better with an “integration-andlearning” approach than with other approaches).
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In fact, many of the

emerging Latino inter-ethnic cases describe what
appear to be racially hostile environments, even
though the cases are not litigated as racial
harassment cases.

Unfortunately, court opinions

reflect a fanciful notion of diversity that is not
supported by scientific research or legal doctrine.
The diversity defense is most explicitly and
comprehensively articulated in the 2004 case Arrocha
v. CUNY,141 which serves as the paradigmatic example
of the analytical problems surfacing in the emerging
inter-ethnic discrimination cases.

This Article

focuses upon Arrocha to present the doctrinal
problems of the diversity defense.

In Arrocha, a

self-identified Afro-Panamanian tutor of Spanish sued
City University of New York (CUNY) for failure to
renew his appointment as an adjunct instructor,
claiming a violation of Title VII’s prohibition
against race and national-origin discrimination.

The

plaintiff alleged that the Latino heads of the Medgar

140

See Shari Caudron, Diversity Ignites Effective

Work Teams, BLACK EOE J., Spring 2005, at 40 (stating
that resegregation can occur when racial bias is
ignored as an issue in the workplace).

Legal scholar

Cynthia Estlund also notes that the potential for
conflict is heightened in low-wage settings and
contingent employment sectors where employees’
motivation to overcome differences is undermined by
their tenuous connection to the workplace and
employer suppression of communication among workers.
ESTLUND, supra note 138, at 45, 56.
141

2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004).
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Evers College Spanish department discriminated
against “Black Hispanics,” and that there was “a
disturbing culture of favoritism that favor[ed] the
appointments of white Cubans, Spaniards and white
Hispanics from South America.”142

Yet the court

dismissed his race and national-origin discrimination
claims because the judge did not understand how a
color hierarchy informs the ways in which Latinos
subject other Latinos to racism and national-origin
bias.143

Indeed, the national-origin claim was

142

Id. at *7.

143

Ironically, the judge sua sponte converted the

claim into a color-discrimination claim and allowed
it to survive the summary judgment motion.

This is

an unsatisfactory characterization of Latino interethnic discrimination claims because not all Latino
plaintiffs who experience discrimination have dark
skin or prominent African features as markers of
their social treatment.

For those Latino plaintiffs

whose African ancestry is not readily discernible, it
is important to examine a workplace environment for
the deployment of racial stereotypes tied to national
origin status that are an aspect of Latino racial
discourse.

Indeed, judges typically view Latino

color-discrimination claims as viable when a Latino
plaintiff alleges color discrimination at the hands
of a White-Anglo employer or supervisor.

See Tanya

Katerí Hernández, Latinos at Work: When Color
Discrimination Means More Than Color, in HIERARCHIES
COLOR: TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
SIGNIFICANCE

OF

ON THE

SOCIAL

AND

OF

CULTURAL

SKIN COLOR (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed.,

forthcoming 2007).

Unfortunately for the plaintiff
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dismissed on summary judgment because five of the
eight adjunct instructors who were reappointed were
natives of other South or Central American countries
such as Argentina, Peru, and Mexico, as well as the
Dominican Republic.

The judge stated in the opinion,

“Diversity in an employer’s staff undercuts an
inference of discriminatory intent.”

144

This is a completely erroneous assessment of the
social science doctrine of statistical inference and
its evidentiary justification as it has been
incorporated into employment discrimination
jurisprudence.145

Population statistics have been

in Arrocha, the jury trial on the colordiscrimination issue returned a verdict in favor of
the defendant.

Telephone Interview with James A.

Brown, Esq., Attorney for Mr. Arrocha (Feb. 28,
2006).

Such a result was inevitable once the judge

handicapped the jury’s assessment of the issues by
entering summary judgment on the racial and national
origin discrimination claims and thus presented the
color claim in isolation from its connections to race
and national origin discrimination.
144

Arrocha, 2004 WL 594981, at *7 (emphasis added).

145

See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 - 97

(1977) (explaining the precise methods of measuring
statistical significance of racial disparities).
While statistical significance suggests that two or
more variables are correlated, its absence yields no
definite conclusions about the relationship between
the variables.

See generally DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES

W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF

OF

DISCRIMINATION (1980); JOSEPH

L. GASTWIRTH, STATISTICAL REASONING

IN

LAW

AND

PUBLIC POLICY
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traditionally considered relevant to Title VII cases
involving gross under-representations of racial
minorities because our racial history demonstrates
that in the absence of any other explanation it is
more likely than not that racial discrimination
accounts for the gross under-representation.146

Yet

the initial Supreme Court authorization in McDonnell

(1988); RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILBORN, THE STATISTICS
OF

DISCRIMINATION (1994). In the absence of statistical

significance, it is difficult to conclude from a
comparison between workforce composition numbers and
those of the relevant labor market that some social
construct other than pure chance accounts for the
workforce numbers.

But that absence does not

foreclose the possibility that factors other than
pure chance actually did influence the workforce
composition numbers, and more importantly that the
individual plaintiff might have received
discriminatory treatment.
PLAINTIFFS

IN

See KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING

TITLE VII ACTIONS, 14 - 28 (2d ed. supp.

2005) (“Courts have sometimes erroneously stated that
a statistical calculation yielding less than a
finding of a statistically significant level of
improbability is affirmative evidence of the absence
of discrimination.

This is completely illogical and

an abuse of statistics for several reasons.”).
146

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.

324, 340 n.20 (1977) (“Statistics showing racial or
ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this
one only because such imbalance is often a telltale
sign of purposeful discrimination . . . .” (emphasis
added)).

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Hernández (CRCL)

01/26/09 9:45 AM

Page 70

Douglas Corp. v. Green to use workforce statistics in
individual disparate treatment cases was only an
authorization insofar as such statistics “may be
helpful to a determination of whether petitioner’s
refusal to hire respondent in this case conformed to
a general pattern of discrimination.”147

There was no

suggestion that workforce statistics could have a
conclusive exculpatory use in such cases.

Inverting

the traditional use of population statistics by
treating a racially diverse workforce as the
equivalent of a bias-free workplace also contravenes
an early Supreme Court approach to proving Title VII
employment discrimination when the plaintiff’s
protected class is proportionately represented in the
workplace.148

147

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

805 (1973).
148

The diversity defense’s esteem for the probative

value of workforce composition statistics in
discrimination cases stands in marked contrast to
courts’ usual disinclination to rely upon workforce
statistics to decide individual disparate treatment
cases.

See, e.g., Bogren v. Minnesota, 236 F.3d 399,

406 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Second, we conclude the generic
type of employment statistics presented by Bogren are
not probative of the reason for her termination.”);
Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 349
(7th Cir. 1997) (“[S]tatistics are improper vehicles
to prove discrimination in disparate treatment (as
opposed to disparate impact) cases.”); Martin v.
Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 218 (2d Cir. 1985) (“We
have previously held that such statistical proof
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What follows is a detailed account of
established employment discrimination doctrine that
is completely overlooked in the emerging inter-ethnic
discrimination cases.

The doctrinal details are

presented to underscore the extent to which diversity
rhetoric subverts the judicial application of
existing relevant doctrine.

C. The Traditional Role of Workforce Composition Data
in Employment Discrimination Cases

In 1971, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,149
the Supreme Court was presented with a gender
discrimination case in which summary judgment had
been granted in favor of an employer that did not
accept job applications from women with pre-schoolage children despite employing men with pre-schoolage children.

The district court had based its award

of summary judgment upon the premise that no question
of bias could exist in a workplace in which 75 to 80%
of those hired were women from an application pool in
which 70 to 75% were women.150

In vacating the

alone cannot ordinarily establish a prima facie case
of disparate treatment under Title VII or § 1981.”);
Davis v. Ashcroft, 355 F. Supp. 2d 330 (D.D.C. 2005)
(holding that plaintiff’s workforce statistics were
insufficient to show employer’s articulated reason
for denying promotion was a pretext for
discrimination).
149

Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542

(1971).
150

Id. at 543.
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summary judgment due to a conflict with Title VII’s
mandate, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
unanimously rejected the equation of significant
numbers of women in the workplace with the simplistic
conclusion that no bias against women existed.151

In

other words, the Supreme Court was fully aware that
gender discrimination can exist even where a large
number of women are employed in a given workplace.
This is because Title VII creates an individual right
not to be unfairly treated because of protected group
status.

It is immaterial to a proof of

discrimination against that individual whether other
members of the protected group have been hired.

It

is true that an inference of discrimination can be
based upon a statistically significant
disproportionate absence of protected group members
from a workplace because it often reflects unstated
bias, unless some other factor such as the
unavailability of qualified group members can be
shown to exist.152

But Title VII does not impose the

symmetrical abstraction of insisting that a
proportionate representation of protected class
members precludes a finding of discrimination.
The Marietta analysis was applied to racial
discrimination in 1978, albeit without citation to
Marietta itself.

In Furnco Construction Corp. v.

Waters153 the Supreme Court stated that a “racially

151

Id. at 544.

152

See Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431

U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
153

Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567

(1978).
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balanced work force cannot immunize an employer from
liability for specific acts of discrimination."154
This is because Title VII is designed to address the
individual’s experience of discrimination.

The Court

noted in Furnco, “It is clear beyond cavil that the
obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an
equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of
race, without regard to whether members of the
applicant’s race are already proportionately
represented in the work force.”155

Nor is Furnco an

outdated articulation of discrimination
jurisprudence, given the Court’s reliance upon this
particular premise in the 2000 case of Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc.156 To be sure, Furnco

154

Id. at 579.

155

Id.

Contrast the diversity defense use of

aggregate workforce statistics with the entrenched
treatment of individual disparate treatment claims as
unique to the plaintiff so that the aggregate
treatment of a class action certification is rarely
possible.

See, e.g., Abron v. Black & Decker, Inc.,

654 F.2d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1981) (concluding that
plaintiff’s claim was “a solitary one that could not
support a class certification”);

see also Melissa

Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 787 - 88 (2005)
(describing judicial hostility toward class action
certification in disparate treatment cases).
156

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 153 (2000) (“[T]he other evidence on which
the court relied -- that Caldwell and Oswalt were
also cited for poor recordkeeping, and that
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does note that a court may consider the racial mix of
the workforce in making a determination about the
existence of discriminatory motive because the
composition of the workforce “is not wholly
irrelevant on the issue of intent.”

157

However, that

is far from treating workforce composition data as
conclusively demonstrating the absence of
discriminatory intent.

Such an equivalence is

prohibited by Furnco.158
Arrocha disregards Furnco and other Supreme

respondent employed many managers over age 50 -although relevant, is certainly not dispositive.”
(citing Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580)).
157

Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580.

158

Id; see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,

453 - 54 (1982) (holding that for disparate impact
claims it is immaterial that “bottom-line” hiring
results were racially balanced and concluding that
this balance does not preclude a Title VII violation
for application of a facially discriminatory policy
to an individual plaintiff).

The doctrinal focus on

discrimination against an individual, as opposed to
the diversity of the workplace, is also reflected in
the prohibition against the use of race norming.
Race norming is any adjustment of test scores to
diminish the disproportionate impact on racial
minorities.

Section 106 of the Civil Rights Act of

1991 prohibits it.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1) (2000).

Although race norming could be used to ensure a
racially integrated workforce, it is prohibited by
law because Title VII focuses on discrimination, not
diversity.
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Court precedent rejecting the premise that a racially
balanced workforce conclusively demonstrates the
absence of discriminatory intent.

The only juridical

support cited in Arrocha for the premise that
“diversity . . . undercuts an inference of
discriminatory intent”159 is a reference to Chambers
v. TRM Copy Center Corp.160 Chambers is another interethnic employment discrimination case in which the
appellate court opinion discussed in passing how a
court might assess the ethnic makeup of a workforce.
In Chambers, a “black person of dark skin and
Jamaican national origin” alleged employment
discrimination based on race and national origin when
he received a letter of reprimand from his African
American supervisor.161

The appellate court

recognized that an inference of no discrimination
might be appropriate where the ethnic makeup of the
workforce was particularly varied162 and there was no
direct proof of discriminatory animus, as is
sometimes provided by racially invidious remarks by
supervisors and coworkers.

Yet the court was also

careful to note that the diverse workforce

159

Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981, at *7 (E.D.N.Y

Feb. 9, 2004).
160

Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctr. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 38

(2d Cir. 1994).
161

Id. at 32.

162

The twelve-person workforce comprised

“5

Caucasian, 4 African-American or dark-skinned West
Indians (including the plaintiff and the Service
Center Manager), 2 Asians, and 1 Hispanic.”

Id. at

33.
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composition would not be dispositive in all contexts.
“[I]f, for example, the company had sought to
downsize its operation and chose to do so by firing
only one or more of its minority employees,” evidence
of a racially balanced workforce would not be
salient.163

In fact, the appellate court in Chambers

ultimately vacated the defendant’s summary judgment
victory.

The court remanded for trial because the

plaintiff’s discharge, absent concrete reasons,
occurred in circumstances that permitted a rational
factfinder to infer invidious discrimination
regardless of the workforce’s racial composition.164
In short, while Chambers inaccurately assesses
the ability of a racially balanced workforce to
support an inference of no discriminatory animus, its
overarching import is the need to examine all factors
in context before coming to any conclusions.

In

fact, Chambers has been relied upon by the Southern
District of New York for the proposition that “a
diverse workforce in itself does not preclude the
finding of an inference of discrimination.”165

Yet

the Eastern District of New York, which decided
Arrocha, continues to use Chambers as support for the
premise that diversity undercuts an inference of
discrimination in a manner that equates diversity
with the absence of discrimination.166

This

163

Id. at 38.

164

Id. at 40.

165

Thompson v. Am. Eagle Airlines, No. 99 Civ. 4529

(JGK), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14932, at *16 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 4, 2000).
166

See Subramanian v. Prudential Sec., No. CV-01-
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equivalence is struck despite its contravention of
social science, its conflict with Supreme Court
precedent, and the implicit rejection of the premise
by an earlier Second Circuit decision.167
What then might account for the maverick
judicial use of bald dialectical reasoning and little
else168 to assert that diversity necessarily indicates

6500(SJF)(RLM), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23231, at *7,
*23 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2003) (asserting that given
diversity in defendant’s workforce, where an Asian
plaintiff from India worked with Korean, African
American, Hispanic, and White-Anglo coworkers, the
plaintiff’s burden of proof was heightened).
167

Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d

1370, 1379 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that the
absence of statistical significance can simply
reflect the use of a small sample size and cannot be
equated with the absence of a correlation between
race and employment decisions).
168

While courts do have broad discretion in their

ability to take judicial notice of legislative facts
that relate to the interpretation of applicable law,
this discretion does not authorize courts to ignore
relevant legal precedents. See the FED. R. EVID. 201(a)
advisory committee note suggesting that courts should
be free to initiate independent research for
legislative facts and take judicial notice of them.
But because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
supply guidance as to how legislative facts should be
incorporated into a case (in contrast to the guidance
set forth in FED. R. EVID. 201(a) for incorporating
adjudicative facts), with legislative facts a judge
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Perhaps the diversity

defense judges have taken their cue from the dicta in
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks,169 an example of the rhetorical power
of the diversity defense to dismiss a suggestion of
discrimination.

D. The New Push for Doctrinal Symmetry in the
Treatment of Workforce Composition Data

In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that once an
employer produces evidence of a nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action, it is
immaterial whether the trier of fact is persuaded of
the veracity of the proffered nondiscriminatory
reason.

The mere production of the nondiscriminatory

reason is sufficient to rebut the presumption of
intentional discrimination from the plaintiff’s prima
facie case.

This is because the ultimate burden of

persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times.
In response to the dissent’s abhorrence of accepting
at face value the proffer of any specious
nondiscriminatory reason by an employer, Justice
Scalia provides the following hypothetical for

has a dangerous freedom to create new law
inappropriately.

See Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a

Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption
of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1541,
1598 (1987) (proposing a tradition of care standard
for regulating judicial use of legislative facts).
169

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).
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consideration:
Assume that 40% of a business’ workforce are
members of a particular minority group, a group
which comprises only 10% of the relevant labor
market.
An applicant, who is a member of that
group, applies for an opening for which he is
minimally qualified, but is rejected by a hiring
officer of that same minority group, and the
search to fill the opening continues. . . .
Under the dissent’s interpretation of our law
. . . [t]he disproportionate minority makeup of
the company’s workforce and the fact that its
hiring officer was of the same minority group as
the plaintiff will be irrelevant, because the
plaintiff’s case can be proved indirectly by
showing
that
the
employer’s
proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence . . . . [I]t
is a mockery of justice to say that if the jury
believes the reason they set forth is probably
not the “true” one, all the utterly compelling
evidence that discrimination was not the reason
will
then
be
excluded
from
the
jury’s
consideration.170
While the hypothetical is pure dicta, it is most
interesting to note that both the majority and the
dissent refer to the hypothetical construction of a
disproportionate minority makeup of the workforce and
the presence of a racial minority hiring officer as
indicating the absence of discrimination.

This is

evidenced by Scalia’s reference to the hypothetical
as “utterly compelling evidence that discrimination
was not the reason,”171 and the dissent’s
characterization that the hypothetical employer could
easily prove a “nondiscriminatory reason it almost
certainly must have had, given the facts assumed.”172
In short, despite the lack of precedent or
statistics doctrinal support, both the Court’s

170

Id. at 513 – 14 & n.5 (internal quotations and

citation omitted).
171

Id. at 514.

172

Id. at 539 n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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opinion and the dissent are caught up in their own
intuitive notion that a diverse workforce is a
barometer for nondiscrimination and that racial
minorities cannot harbor racial bias themselves.

The

majority opinion and the dissent can be characterized
as based upon intuition to the extent established
Title VII doctrine has not similarly applied a
symmetrical approach to proof of discrimination and
nondiscrimination.

For instance, the use of

anecdotal evidence is treated differently when
presented for purposes of proving discrimination than
when presented to prove nondiscrimination.173
Anecdotal evidence can be considered strong evidence
of intentional discrimination.174

In contrast,

anecdotal evidence of nondiscrimination carries
little evidentiary weight.175

The justification for

the asymmetrical approach to anecdotal evidence is
the same one that supports the use of a prima facie
inference of discrimination in disparate treatment
cases -- namely, the understanding that
discriminatory intent is often concealed -- and
necessitates the admission of circumstantial evidence
and the use of inferences to enforce the mandate

173

See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 145, § 3.01 n.2

(“[C]ourts tend to rely on anecdotal evidence only
when it cuts in favor of the plaintiff . . . . ”).
174

See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431

U.S. 324, 342 - 43 n.24 (1977).
175

Id.

Anecdotal evidence of nondiscrimination may

include employer statements that it does not
discriminate.

PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 145, §

3.01 n.2.
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This is not the case for

disputing an allegation of discrimination.

It is a

straightforward matter for an employer to present
evidence of actual bases for employment decisions.
There is no need for inferences from statistical data
or anecdotal evidence, nor would such evidence be
probative given the very strong possibility that
discriminatory motive can coexist with such
statistical data and anecdotal evidence.

In

contrast, this nation’s history of racial inequality
has shown that in the absence of a concrete
explanation, the inference of discrimination is an
accurate indicator for the actual existence of
discrimination.176

Scalia’s hypothetical in Hicks

reveals the extent to which a disregard for the
contemporary significance of the nation’s history of
racism can undermine the justifications for the
asymmetrical use of inference and other evidentiary
tools.177

176

Moreover, it demonstrates how the Court is

See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,

577 (1978) (describing the McDonnell Douglas use of
inference for finding discrimination as a “sensible,
orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of
common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination”) (emphasis added).
177

Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:

The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J.
279, 283 (1997) (explaining how the original
structures for proving discrimination “functioned
properly only when the courts applying them were
willing to see discrimination as a viable explanation
for social and political conditions” connected to a
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unacquainted with, or perhaps disinterested in, the
manifestation of discrimination within diverse
settings and amongst racial minorities themselves,
and is thus just as subject to the obfuscation of
diversity rhetoric as lower courts.

In fact, the

general jurisprudential movement of narrowing the
applicability of antidiscrimination law provides a
hospitable setting for the growth of the diversity
defense.178

Indeed, the narrow vision suggested by

the Hicks hypothetical is in direct contrast to
Supreme Court precedent.
In Castaneda v. Partida,179 the Court stated that
“it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law

history that “suggested that discrimination was the
most likely explanation”);

see also Susan Bisom-

Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and
Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice,
26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 1031 (1999) (“To base
Supreme Court precedent on a hypothetical that bears
little resemblance to reality is strikingly ill
advised.”); John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in
Employment Discrimination Law:

Slouching Toward a

Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REV.
709, 747 (2002) (“Scalia’s hypothetical is telling.
Apart from having absolutely nothing to do with the
case he is deciding, Scalia’s hypothetical reveals he
believes that most discrimination cases do not
involve discrimination at all.”).
178

See AWAKENING FROM

THE

NEW STRUGGLE

FOR

THE

DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE

AND

EQUAL JUSTICE (Denise C. Morgan et al.

eds., 2006).
179

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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that human beings of one definable group will not
discriminate against other members of their group.”180
Castaneda is also particularly relevant given its
rejection of the governing majority defense to
discrimination that resonates with the equally
specious diversity defense.

The governing majority

theory asserts that a prima facie case of
discrimination can be rebutted with the proof that
racial minorities were the governing majority of
decision-makers involved.

In Castaneda, the Supreme

Court rejected out of hand the notion that a prima
facie case of discriminatory intent based on the
exclusion of Mexican Americans from the grand jury
could be rebutted with proof that three of the five
jury commissioners were Mexican American.181
Yet despite the clearly articulated precedents
of Castaneda182 and Furnco, which disentangle notions

180

Id. at 499.

181

Id. at 500.

182

Over the years, Castaneda has been relied upon as

viable precedent regarding the inapplicability of a
governing majority defense to discrimination.

See

Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1004 (5th Cir.
1981); Ausler v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 245 F. Supp. 2d
1024, 1031 (E.D. Ark. 2003); Eccleston v. Sec’y of
the Navy, 700 F. Supp. 67, 69 (D.D.C. 1988).

In

addition, social scientists have continued to
document the persistence of intraracial prejudice,
which refutes the skepticism about its existence
expressed by Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in
Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 518 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices
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of diversity from proof of nondiscrimination, the
Hicks opinion presents a hypothetical that
recharacterizes diversity as the equivalent of
nondiscrimination.

As one employment discrimination

scholar notes about the case, “[t]o base Supreme
Court precedent on a hypothetical that bears little
resemblance to reality is strikingly ill advised.”183
Moreover, by requiring plaintiffs to provide actual
proof of discriminatory intent even after showing
that a defendant’s rebuttal was not credible, Hicks
gives judges vast discretion to create their own

here in Washington decide solely on the basis of
inferences from statistics that the Mexican-Americans
who control the levers of power in this remote border
county are manipulating them to discriminate ‘against
themselves.’”).
BLACK: DIVERSITY

IN

See WILLIAM E. CROSS, JR., SHADES

OF

AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDENTITY (1991)

(exploring the relationship between racial identity
attitudes and internalized racism in African
Americans); Aaron C. Cargile, Attitudes Toward
Chinese-Accented Speech: An Investigation in Two
Contexts, 16 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 434 (1997)
(describing negative attitudes of Asian Americans
toward Mandarin-Chinese-accented English within a
college classroom);
the Crossfire:

Marta I. Cruz-Janzen, Lives on

The Struggle of Multiethnic and

Multiracial Latinos for Identity in a Dichotomous and
Racialized World, 9 RACE, GENDER & CLASS 47 (2002)
(discussing Latinos’ internalization of bias against
dark-skinned Latinos).
183

Bisom-Rapp, supra note 177, at 1031.
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definitions of what constitutes discrimination,184
undermining the adjudicatory force of the prima facie
proof established by McConnell Douglas v. Green.

As

civil rights scholar John Valery White astutely
observes:
Because Hicks and Reeves now require
plaintiffs to produce evidence of
discriminatory intent, judges must
specifically decide what acts constitute
race acts and which do not. With neither
guidance from above, nor coherent
categories with which to work, judges after
Hicks are empowered to answer these
questions according to their own theories
of life.185
Indeed, after Hicks, district court judges are
certainly assessing summary judgment motions through
the lenses of their own particular understanding of

184

White, supra note 177, at 759 (“Through a minor

adjustment in proof structures, Hicks has unleashed
district courts to answer these questions on their
own, through judges’ imposition of their own
definition of race, discrimination, and appropriate
workplace behavior.”);

see also Henry L. Chambers,

Jr., Getting it Right: Uncertainty and Error in the
New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 43
- 44 (1996) (describing the post-Hicks prima facie
case assessment as “the fact-finder’s perceived
prevalence of intentional discrimination in
society”); Sheila R. Foster, Causation in
Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact,
41 HOUS. L. REV. 1469, 1525 (2005) (“Instead, the Court
has unleashed the factfinder into a world of causal
inquiry that is subject to the very biases,
stereotypes, and misconceptions that underlie the
discrimination of which the plaintiff complains.”).
185

White, supra note 177, at 727.
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Unfortunately, that understanding

seems to be increasingly influenced by public
discourse that presents racial diversity as the
equivalent of racial harmony.187

The Arrocha case

discussed in Section II.B above is an example of a
judge who concocts a diversity defense to
discrimination based on his own perspectives of what
constitutes discrimination.188

E. Diversity and the Presumed Interchangeability of
Latinos

The diversity defense in the Arrocha case is
problematic in its incoherent understanding of
employment discrimination law’s application of
statistical analysis and of Supreme Court precedents
related to the issue.

Furthermore, in dismissing the

national origin claim because the Afro-Panamanian
plaintiff’s employer reappointed natives from other
South and Central American countries instead of him,
the Arrocha court treats all Latinos as
interchangeable and incapable of national-origin
discrimination against other Latinos.189

186

The mistaken

Id. at 716 (“In general Hicks was blamed for

initiating a considerably more suspicious view of
Title VII claims and unleashing federal judges to
reject claims on summary judgment when the facts were
unpersuasive to the judge.”).
187

See supra notes 134 - 137 and accompanying text.

188

Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9,

2004).
189

The presumed interchangeability of Latinos in

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36

Hernández (CRCL)

01/26/09 9:45 AM

Page 87

treatment of the panethnic identifier of
Latino/Hispanic as precluding discrimination between
various Latinos is also present in other Latino
inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases.190

employment discrimination cases resembles the
judicial treatment of color-bias claims brought by
African Americans.

Specifically, courts have

difficulty identifying the manifestation of
discrimination within African American communities
when assessing color-based discrimination claims
brought by persons of African ancestry.

This is

because judges presume that all persons of African
ancestry are viewed as the same regardless of skin
color or ethnicity.

The presumed sameness of African

ancestry obscures the analysis of colorism claims.
See Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism:

A Darker Shade of

Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1731 (2000) (discussing
the influence of the rule of hypo-descent on the
judicial application of color-discrimination doctrine
to persons of African ancestry); see also Trina
Jones, Shades of Brown:

The Law of Skin Color, 49

DUKE L.J, 1487, 1544 (2000) (noting that it can be
difficult for a court “to believe that a person who
hires Blacks will engage in discrimination against
other Blacks, or that a person who is Black would
discriminate against another Black person”).
190

See, e.g., Patino v. Rucker, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS

29691 (2d Cir. July 25, 1997).

In this case a Puerto

Rican porter for Columbia University alleged that he
was discharged by his Hispanic supervisor and
replaced with another Latino porter, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

In granting the
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This, of course, directly contravenes the Supreme
Court mandate in Castaneda not to presume that intraethnic and intra-racial discrimination cannot
exist.191

Treating Latinos as interchangeable also

denies them protection against national origin
discrimination when the employer’s agents are Latinos
as well.

The Supreme Court’s own definition of

national origin as referring “to the country where a
person was born, or, more broadly, the country from
which his or her ancestors came,”192 conflicts with

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the judge
noted that the plaintiff failed to respond to the
defendant’s persuasive “evidence” that the plaintiff
had previously replaced a Hispanic employee, that the
accused supervisor was Hispanic, and that 90% of the
employees in the department were Hispanic.

Informing

the diversity defense in Patino is the view of the
Hispanic category as a racial unifier that prevents
group members from being biased against one another.
The notion that Latinos are a racially mixed people
may also be informing the court’s assessment.
191

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)

(“[I]t would be unwise to presume as a matter of law
that human beings of one definable group will not
discriminate against other members of their group.”).
192

Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88

(1973); see id. at 89 (“The only direct definition
given the phrase ‘national origin’ is the following
remark made on the floor of the House of
Representatives by Congressman Roosevelt, Chairman of
the House Subcommittee which reported the bill: ‘It
means the country from which you or your forebears
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the way the diversity defense lumps all Latinos into
one undifferentiated group.193

came.’”);

Certainly, where a

see also Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec.

Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 766 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica,
C.J., concurring) (noting that a plaintiff with a
national-origin claim must “trace ancestry to a
nation outside of the United States” and thus a
“Confederate Southern-American” is not a valid
national-origin class under Title VII). But see
Earnhardt v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 744 F.2d 1,
2 - 3 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that in Puerto Rico a
plaintiff born in the continental United States can
assert a national-origin discrimination claim).

For

an in-depth critique of the current limitations of
the legal definition for national origin, see Perea,
supra note 132, at 857 (proposing that Congress
legislate an expansive definition of “national
origin” that includes discrimination based upon
ethnic traits such as alienage status and language
preference).
193

See Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-

Conflating Latinos/as’ Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANOLATINO L. REV. 69, 73 (1998) (detailing the ways
Latinos are inappropriately depicted as a homogeneous
group).

Symbolic homogenization is not restricted to

Latinos.

See Aaron Celious & Daphna Oyserman, Race

From the Inside: An Emerging Heterogeneous Race
Model, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 149, 150 - 53 (2001)
(describing how African Americans are often presented
as a homogeneous group despite the ways social,
economic, gender, and physical traits vary the racial
experiences of different African Americans).
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White-Anglo employer is alleged to have discriminated
against a Latino, the binary White-Anglo-versusLatino context may justify the simple reference to
the plaintiff as a “Latino” or “Hispanic” with
standing to bring a national-origin claim.194
However, where a Latino plaintiff from a particular
country is alleging national-origin discrimination at

194

It is probably for this very purpose that while

the EEOC does not define national origin, it chooses
to define national origin discrimination “broadly as
including, but not limited to, the denial of equal
employment opportunity because of an individual’s, or
his or her ancestor’s place of origin; or because an
individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic
characteristics of a national origin group.”

29

C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2007) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, at least one district court has
permitted Latino plaintiffs to bring national-origin
discrimination allegations based upon their “Spanishspeaking characteristic” alone where a White-Anglo
defendant may have had no actual knowledge of the
plaintiff’s exact place of origin, but instituted
policies that disparately impacted and discriminated
based upon the foreignness of the plaintiffs.

See

Alemendares v. Palmer, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23258,
at *31 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2002) (“Because plaintiffs
have linguistic characteristics of a particular
national origin group –- as required in the EEOC’s
definition of ‘national origin discrimination’ -–
they have sufficiently pled a claim of national
origin discrimination.

Plaintiffs’ Spanish-speaking

characteristics reflect their national origin.”).
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the hands of a Latino from another country of origin,
it would be nonsensical to ignore the distinctions in
country of origin.

Similarly, it would defy logic to

presume that an employer’s preference for one Latino
over another should insulate the employer from an
inquiry about discriminatory intent.

Such an

interpretation of antidiscrimination jurisprudence
would, like the emerging diversity defense to
discrimination, be yet another misplaced application
of symmetry to the doctrine.195
Supreme Court precedent should temper any
district court inclination to presume symmetrically
that because the replacement of a discharged racially
excluded employee with a White employee gives rise to
a prima facie case of discrimination,196 the

195

See supra notes 173 - 181 and accompanying text.

196

A number of jurisdictions have concluded that

proof that a protected class member has been
unfavorably treated relative to someone not in the
protected class can be an element of a prima facie
case of racial discrimination.

See, e.g., Leadbetter

v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 690 (6th Cir. 2004)
(requiring reverse-discrimination plaintiffs to prove
that other employees of similar qualifications who
were not members of the protected class were more
favorably treated in order to set forth a prima face
case of discrimination); Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop
Tires N. Am., Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014, 1015 (11th Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (noting that part of establishing
a prima facie case of discrimination is showing that
employer either filled plaintiff’s position with a
person not of the same racial minority or left the
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replacement of a discharged racially excluded
employee with another racially excluded employee is,
in turn, proof of nondiscriminatory intent on the
part of the employer.

In O’Connor v. Consolidated

Coin Caterers Corp., the Supreme Court explicitly
held in the context of age discrimination that it is
immaterial that a statutorily protected class member
was replaced by someone who is also a protected class
member.197

Because O’Connor entailed a development of

the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard for
discrimination,198 its discussion of protected class
member replacements in the age discrimination context
is analytically applicable to race discrimination
cases.199

position open); Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 516
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (requiring as an element of a prima
facie case of discrimination proof either that
someone not of the plaintiffs’ protected class filled
the position or that the position remained vacant).
197

517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (“The fact that one

person in the protected class has lost out to another
person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so
long as he has lost out because of his age.”).
198

Id. at 312 (“Because it lacks probative value, the

fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone
outside the protected class is not a proper element
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.”).
199

See Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157,

158 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (applying O’Connor
to a Title VII racial discrimination case). “Laws
against discrimination protect persons, not classes,
the Court remarked, an observation with equal force
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Unfortunately, the treatment of Latinos of
varying racial and ethnic backgrounds as a
homogeneous group also adversely influences the
analysis of the nature of Latino inter-ethnic
discrimination that cannot be addressed by O’Connor
alone.

For instance, the interchangeability of

Latinos’ perspectives in Arrocha completely fails to
appreciate the ways in which internal Latino national
origin bias is rooted in a racialized hierarchy of
Latin American countries, where countries perceived
as European are viewed as more advanced than those
more significantly populated with people of
indigenous descent or those of African descent.200

In

the list of countries the judge thought equivalent,
Latin American racial constructs would rank Argentina
as a highly valued White country, followed by Peru
and Mexico with their indigenous populations,
followed by the Dominican Republic and the
plaintiff’s own country of origin, Panama, because of
they are populated by more people of African descent.
For Latinos influenced by Latin American racial
paradigms where each country has a racial
identification, a diverse workforce of Latinos is not
the immediate equivalent of a bias-free context.

Nor

is a color preference divorced from a racialized
ideology within the Latino context.201

Diversity

in a case under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id.;
see also Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., 191 F.3d 344,
355 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying O’Connor to a Title VII
gender discrimination case).
200

See supra notes 43 - 44 and accompanying text.

201

See DE GENOVA & RAMOS-ZAYAS, supra note 106, at 214
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means something more nuanced to people of color, who
do not view all ethnic groups as the same simply
because they are non-White.

The public discourse

about diversity as a panacea for racial
discrimination overlooks the complexity of actual
diversity.
Part of the difficulty that judges have in
disentangling notions of diversity from
discrimination may stem from overlooking the
operation of what Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati term
“working identity.”202

Carbado and Gulati assert that

judges utilize such a narrow conception of what race
is that they often disregard the extent to which
racial and ethnic discrimination manifests itself not

(describing how “intra-Latino divisions seem always
to be entrenched in the hegemonic denigration of
African Americans” and blackness).
202

Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black

Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 702 (2001)
(“Understanding the relationship between
discrimination and performance, we argue, is crucial
to developing a plausible and coherent theory of
discrimination.”); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati,
Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000);
accord Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and
Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the
Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004)
(arguing that Title VII has been misinterpreted to
exclude those cases in which employees are
disparately treated based upon racially specific
grooming choices that are integral to racial
identity).
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simply by a plaintiff’s membership in a protected
class, but also by an employer’s stereotyped
expectations about “racial conduct.”203

To be

precise, Carbado and Gulati theorize that
discrimination in a diverse setting can occur when
the least racially assimilated employee or
prospective employee is targeted for disparate
treatment.204

One example that Carbado and Gulati

provide is of a law school faculty inclined to
exclude any female Asian American teaching candidate
whose conduct does not challenge the stereotype of
“Asian-American females as lacking authority and

203

Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note

202, at 1262;

see also Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning

a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013 (1995)
(describing the ways in which Whites’ lack of
consciousness of having a race disconnects them from
recognizing the full spectrum of their racialized
decisionmaking when assessing the conduct of
employees who do not conform to expectations of
racial assimilation within predominantly White
workplaces).
204

An employer that has a record of promoting
black employees is likely to persuade a
court that insufficient evidence of racial
animus exists. The court assumes that
because the employer thinks that some
blacks are “good,” the reason the employer
thought the plaintiff was “bad” had nothing
to do with the plaintiff’s race. The court
is likely to conclude that the reason for
the termination was simply the employer’s
dislike of the individual, which does not
produce an actionable discrimination case.
Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 202,
at 1298.
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If the law school

faculty were instead to hire another Asian American
female candidate whose racial performance was more
visibly commanding and vocal, it would not vitiate
the disparate treatment that the faculty accorded the
first candidate based on their unconscious
stereotypes.

“To make this concrete, if ten black

employees are up for promotion, and nine are
promoted, a court should still not negate the
possibility that the tenth was denied a promotion
because of his race:

The other nine employees may

have been engaged in racially palatable identity
performances.”206

Judicial willingness to inquire

into the possibility of discrimination in an
individual instance of racial exclusion within an
otherwise “diverse” workplace setting will depend
upon jurists’ attention to what racial differences an
employer finds acceptable and unacceptable, and the
ways in which that calculus itself is
discrimination.207

Certainly, the EEOC’s recent

205

Id. at 1272.

206

Id. at 1298.

207

One example of a judge who demonstrates an

understanding of the implications of a racial
performance in working identity can be found in Davis
v. Boykin Mgmt. Co., 1994 WL 714517, at *4 (W.D.N.Y.
Dec. 21, 1994):
[A]n employer might tolerate outspokenness
in
his
white
employees
but
find
objectionable a comparable lack of reserve
by a black employee because of a feeling
that blacks should “know their place.”
If
his solution is to fire the outspoken black
in favor of a more docile or reserved black
employee, his action obviously still is
discriminatory even though the position was
not
filled
by
a
“non-protected
class
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settlement agreements in cases in which employers
have categorically preferred one non-White racial
group over another non-White racial group attests to
the fact that employer stereotypes about preferred
racial conduct do exist.208

It is thus not unlikely

that employer racial conduct preferences also inform
those diverse work settings in which an individual
from one racial/ethnic group is disparately treated

member.”
One scholar has raised concerns about using
employment discrimination doctrine to address issues
of racial assimilation.

RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL

CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 189 (2005) (concluding that an
assimilation focus in employment discrimination
doctrine “invites confusion as to the underlying
purpose and practical application of disparate impact
doctrine and ultimately ill serves the broader social
goals of reducing underrepresentation and segregation
in the workplace”).

Yet a singular doctrinal focus

on proportional representation in the workplace that
ignores questions of racial assimilation could
ultimately undermine the goal of eradicating racially
biased decisionmaking.

That is why Kenji Yoshino

proposes that employer demands to “act White” be
addressed by requiring employers to offer a rational
reason for coercing conformity.

Yoshino in fact

states that “covering demands are the modern form of
subordination.”
ON

KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT

OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 177 (2006).

“If civil rights law

fails to protect these groups against coerced
conformity, it will have stopped short of its end.”
Id. at 178.
208

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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from an individual from another racial/ethnic group,
such as in Arrocha.
Unfortunately, the misconstrued application of
diversity discourse is not limited to the isolated
case of intra-racial bias among Latino subgroup
members, as in Arrocha.

Although Arrocha serves as

the paradigmatic example of all the deficiencies of
the diversity defense, the deficiencies also manifest
themselves in varying ways in other reported Latino
inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases in which
the alleged bias is instead amongst Latinos and other
people of color (most often African Americans).

For

example, in Sprott v. Franco,209 an African American
woman who worked as deputy director of the New York
City Housing Authority’s Office of Equal Opportunity
alleged that her Hispanic supervisor harassed her and
denied her salary increases because of her race.

In

dismissing the plaintiff’s claim upon defendant’s
request for summary judgment, the judge noted that
the facts failed to raise an inference of
discrimination because “the new Director is an
Hispanic woman . . . .

There are now two deputy

directors - one African-American and one Caucasian. .
. .

The remaining staff is comprised of [sic]

twenty-four Hispanics, twenty-three African
Americans, nine Caucasians, and one person
categorized as ‘other.’”210

Thus the judge accorded a

diverse workplace and the supervisor’s Hispanic
status great power to circumvent racism, without

209

Sprott v. Franco, 1998 WL 472061 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,

1998) (Section 1981 employment discrimination claim).
210

Id. at *6.
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questioning what diversity actually means in the new
demographic social order.

While some judges

mistakenly assert that the existence of a diverse
workplace may undercut a claim about discriminatory
hiring practices, it certainly has no relevance to a
claim about an individual plaintiff’s racial
harassment and pay raise disputes.

Yet this court

conflates those two contexts in ways that seem to
presume that Latino coworkers and diverse workplaces
cannot be bearers of racism.
In Bernard v. New York City Health and Hospitals
Corp.,211 the diversity defense is raised again by a
district court judge, albeit more subtly.

In a pro

se application the plaintiff, a self-described darkskinned Black woman born in Trinidad, alleged that
she had been terminated from her position as an
administrative assistant because of her race, color,
and national origin.

In dismissing her case upon

motion for summary judgment by the defendant
employer, the court took pains to note that the
plaintiff’s former work environment had been an
“ethnically diverse office” staffed predominantly by
Hispanic and African American women.212

Although the

plaintiff alleged several instances of negative
interactions with her Puerto Rican manager and other
Latina co-workers, the court was persuaded to resolve
the dispute on summary judgment.

The court based its

decision on the fact that the associate personnel
director, who never previously had any contact with

211

Bernard v. N.Y. York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,

1996 WL 457284 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1996).
212

Id. at *2.
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the plaintiff, independently concluded that the
plaintiff should be terminated after reviewing all
the records and hearing statements at a disciplinary
meeting.

Why is this personnel director’s opinion so

significant to the court?

The court opinion noted

that at the disciplinary meeting “Ms. Gloria Simmons
. . . the Associate Personnel Director, presided in
her capacity as Labor Relations Officer . . . .
Simmons who is black, had no contact with Bernard
prior to the meeting.”213

As Ms. Simmons was never

identified as a party to the discrimination, there is
no legally relevant reason for identifying her racial
affiliation.

Instead, the racial identification is

situated in the opinion as a mechanism for attesting
to the absence of any discrimination in the
workplace.

In other words, if a Black woman found

there was no discrimination then there could not have
been any discrimination.

Her racial minority status

raises her credibility and is part of the rhetorical
understanding that diverse workplaces are somehow
impervious to racism.
The influence of diversity-as-antidote-todiscrimination discourse has also surfaced in a
defendant’s proffer of proof of nondiscriminatory
intent.

For instance, in EEOC v. Rodriguez,214 the

EEOC filed a pattern and practice discrimination case
based upon an automobile dealership’s failure and
refusal to hire African Americans as salespersons.
The automobile dealership was owned by a man of

213

Id. at *3 (emphasis added).

214

66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1649 (E.D. Cal.

Nov. 16, 1994).
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The EEOC amassed a

significant amount of evidence about the owner’s
stated policy of not hiring African Americans as
salespersons215 and his promotion of a racially
hostile environment.216

Yet despite the wealth of

evidence demonstrating the employer’s discriminatory
practices, the defendant claimed he could not be
“prejudiced” against African Americans because he had
been the subject of discrimination himself.

He

asserted that his own ethnic heritage as a Spaniard
exposed him to racism and thereby inoculated him
against being racist.

215

Id.

While the defense ultimately

The evidence included testimony regarding

racist commentary at the workplace, such as “I don’t
care how good that nigger is, he will never work
here”.

There was also testimony that other dark-

skinned ethnic group members would only be hired upon
demonstrating they were not African American.

For

instance, an East Indian applicant whose skin color
was disfavorably contrasted against a dark-colored
desk as a test for acceptable skin color was told
that the managers might still be able to hire him
because he was Indian and not African American.
Similarly, a dark-skinned Mexican employee
salesperson was saved from being fired by a manager
who thought he was Black when another manager
explained, “It’s ok, he’s not black, he’s Mexican.”
216

Id.

Sales meetings often contained verbal

references to “niggers.”

Other racially disparaging

terms included nigger, sand nigger, we-bes, I-be,
large lips, fucking niggers, hey buckwheat, and hey
boy.
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failed amidst the significant evidence of
discrimination, the defendant’s decision to assert
his own ethnic diversity as a defense highlights the
potential for continued misapplication of diversity
discourse in employment discrimination litigation.

F. Diversity and the “Cultural Misunderstanding”
Dismissal of Discrimination

If many judges in these emerging cases do not
view inter-ethnic discrimination as actual
discrimination, what do they believe the cases
describe?

Two workplace narratives seem to suggest

that decision-makers may instead read inter-ethnic
discrimination claims as instances of mere cultural
misunderstanding.

A July 2004 report from a human

resources director provides a helpful illustration:
I was called in because a small work team
in a laboratory was not meeting deadlines
on an important project. On the surface it
looked like a time management issue to
their supervisor when in fact, two Hispanic
employees on the team had issues that were
culturally rooted -- one being Puerto Rican
and the other being Dominican. Their
issues were getting in the way of the
team’s progress. While unfortunate and
inaccurate, people who were working with
and supervising these employees never
thought something diversity-related was
going on. It never came up on their radar
screens because they saw both employees as
“Hispanic.”217
This workplace case study illustrates two separate
aspects of the opacity of inter-ethnic disputes for
decision-makers.

First, the supervisor simply

identifies a mere personality conflict between two

217

Email from Manager of Learning & Organizational

Dev., to author (July 29, 2004) (on file with
author).
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Latino employees because of the presumption that all
Latinos are part of a monolithic group.

Then, the

human resources director, who is African American and
asserts knowledge about the existence of intra-racial
bias within racial groups, is better able to
appreciate that two Latinos from different ethnic
subgroups can harbor group-based bias against one
another.

Yet even this human resources director

presumes that the conflict is simply “culturally
rooted” rather than informed by Latino racial
ideology about the “inherent racial differences”
between Puerto Ricans and Dominicans.

Thus, even

when a workplace identifies inter-ethnic conflicts,
it is not necessarily equipped to appreciate that
“culture” is not divorced from racism.
Cultural misunderstanding was also the
explanatory factor in entering summary judgment
against a plaintiff in Webb v. R&B Holding Co.218

In

Webb, an African American title clerk in a
predominantly White-Hispanic car dealership was often
referred to as “la negra” (the black girl) and
reprimanded for being “rude.”219

In her complaint,

the plaintiff noted that other employees were not
disciplined for rude behavior.

In granting the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the judge
chastised the plaintiff for filing the discrimination
claim with the following reprimand:

218

Webb v. R&B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.

Fla. 1998).
219

The stereotyped characterization of Black women as

rude has a long history.

See Regina Austin, Sapphire

Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539.
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Over the years, work environments have come
to reflect our increasingly multi-cultural
world. With the coming together of
numerous diverse ethnicities and cultures
in the common workplace, there are bound to
be not only many instances of cultural
harmony but also some occasions of cultural
friction . . . . While this Court
sincerely hopes that all employees of all
cultures will choose to exercise common
respect and courtesy, it cannot allow Title
VII to be used as a sword by which one
culture may achieve supremacy in the
workplace over another” -– by filing a
Title VII claim!220
The judicial assumption seems to be that when Latino
workplace disputes arise they are cultural
misunderstandings and not rooted in racism.

This

judicial assumption conflicts with the growing body
of social science research discussed in Section I of
this Article, illustrating the racial stereotypes
that can exist within Latino communities.

What is

needed is a mechanism for incorporating the realities
of racial complexity demonstrated in the social
science research into antidiscrimination
jurisprudence.

This Article proffers a Multiracial

Racism Litigation Approach as one possible mechanism
for more effectively analyzing inter-ethnic
employment discrimination cases.

III. THE MRLA PROPOSAL: THE MULTIRACIAL RACISM LITIGATION
APPROACH

How can we add nuance to the jurisprudence of
antidiscrimination to make the new demography less
opaque to fact-finders and assist the judiciary and
others in identifying the new markers of racial
discrimination?221

The first step will need to be a

220

Webb, 992 F. Supp. at 1389 (emphasis added).

221

The jurisprudential problem with Latino inter-
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mechanism for developing a fuller record of interethnic racial animus across groups.

For judges who

do not understand racial discrimination unless a
White-Anglo person is present as an instigator or
victim, pleadings will need to be more detailed,
expert witnesses will need to be brought in, and
depositions will need to be more expansive.

In

addition, judicial training sessions will need to be

ethnic discrimination cases identified in this
Article is also subject to all the pre-existing
concerns that many scholars have described regarding
the growing limitations on proving employment
discrimination cases.

See, e.g., E. Christi

Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I:

The

Myth of the Protected Class in Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441 (1998) (“Lower
courts’ reluctance to apply the Supreme Court’s
formation of the prima facie case suggests a
discomfort with the explicit recognition of
historical disadvantage that the prima facie
presumption entails.”); Samuel L. Gaertner et al.,
Aversive Racism: Bias Without Intention, in HANDBOOK
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS

AND

OF

REALITIES 377,

393 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds.,
2005) (concluding that Title VII needs to be reformed
to address in-group favoritism as a form of
discrimination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content
of Our Categories:

A Cognitive Bias Approach to

Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination:

A Structural

Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
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targeted for curriculum reform to address interethnic discrimination specifically.

But this cannot

be done without judicial willingness to consider
empirical data about the broader phenomenon of interethnic bias and its contravention of the diversity
defense.

A. The MRLA Method

One method for facilitating the judicial
admission of inter-ethnic specific empirical data to
defuse the application of the diversity defense is
the development of a “Multiracial Racism Litigation
Approach” (“MRLA”).

The MRLA is the mechanism for

justifying the admission of data about the details of
a specific ethnic/racial group’s racial attitudes
that judges might otherwise view as irrelevant to the
judicial proceedings.

In turn, the MRLA can help

judges to move beyond the veil of a diverse workplace
and summary conclusions of nonactionable “cultural
misunderstanding.”

This will then reinforce for

judges the applicability of firmly established
employment discrimination doctrines to the context of
inter-ethnic discrimination.
The term “multiracial” in Multiracial Racism
Litigation Approach both describes the
multiracial/multi-ethnic context of the cases and the
ways in which multiracial contexts can be imbued with
racism even as they are stereotyped as transcending
race.222

222

Therefore, this Article will use the term

See Hernández, Multiracial Matrix, supra note 37,

at 1098 (describing the ways in which racially
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“multiracial racism lens” to describe a conceptual
focus on whether a defendant’s conduct is an
assertion of racial privilege in a multiracial/multiethnic diverse workplace setting.

In a nutshell, the

MRLA suggests that inter-ethnic employment
discrimination plaintiffs contextualize the
discrimination they allege by:

(1) explicitly

foregrounding the narrative with the premise of
inter-ethnic hierarchy and bias; (2) focusing the
inquiry on whether there were racially advantaged and
disadvantaged employees among the diverse non-White
workers; (3) providing the social science data about
the specific racial attitudes; and (4) demonstrating
the applicability of established employment
discrimination doctrine to diverse workplaces.

diverse contexts are publicly depicted as resolving
racial problems by transcending race).

This Article

uses the term “multiracial” more expansively than do
mixed-race persons using it to denote racial
identity.

Yet the term does encompass the broader

societal notions about the presumed racial
enlightenment of mixed-race persons and diverse
racial demography.

While the term

“multiracial/multi-ethnic” is more descriptive, it is
also more cumbersome and less apt to capture the
racialization that occurs in the manifestation of
animus across groups characterized as ethnic.
MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION
STATES FROM

THE

1960S

TO THE

IN THE

See

UNITED

1980S (1986) (theorizing how

the treatment of various ethnic groups in the United
States is more accurately characterized as a series
of “racial projects”).
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The MRLA is not a whole new theory about the
origins of discrimination.223

Instead, it is a tool

for recognizing our current understandings of
discrimination when it occurs in a multiracial or an
inter-ethnic context.

Just as eyeglasses assist a

person to see more clearly images that already exist,
the multiracial racism lens clarifies the
discrimination that can manifest in diverse
workplaces.

It does so by focusing the pre-existing

Title VII proof structure on the question of who is
functionally privileged and subjugated in a given
context and time.224

223

It provides needed context for

See, e.g., FOUNDATIONS

OF

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 126

- 78 (John J. Donohue III ed., 2d ed. 2003)
(delineating various theories of racial prejudice and
discriminatory conduct).
224

The understanding of racial privilege and

disadvantage as fluid and thereby shifting given a
particular context and timeframe is embodied in Eric
Yamamoto’s concept of simultaneity.

Eric K.

Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency,
Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 ASIAN PAC.
AM. L.J. 33, 38 (1995).

Yamamoto uses simultaneity to

describe how racially subordinated groups “contribute
to and are responsible for the construction of their
own identities and sometimes oppressive inter-group
relations.”

Id.

In other words, a racialized group

can simultaneously be subordinated and a subordinator
of others.

Similarly, Neil Gotanda’s articulation of

racial hierarchy incorporates the helpful perspective
of “racial stratification” which includes the model
of a “hierarchical structure between minorities,”
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the application of the Title VII proof structures
without altering them.

Plaintiffs will attempt to

carry their traditional burden of demonstrating how
the alleged facts amount to discrimination, but will
do so by focusing on cultural and historical
context.225

Defendants will still have the same

opportunity for rebuttal by proffering a
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged
employment decision, in addition to providing expert
witnesses of their own regarding the relevant
cultural and historical context presented by the

instead of a model that exclusively “emphasizes the
subordinate position of all racial and ethnic
minorities.”

Neil Gotanda, Multiculturalism and

Racial Stratification, in MAPPING MULTICULTURALISM 238,
240 (Avery F. Gordon & Christopher Newfield eds.,
1996) (emphasis omitted).
225

While the MRLA recommends that litigators provide

a more extensive narrative in their pleadings to
include data about inter-ethnic racial animus in
order to counteract the diversity defense, the MRLA
does not abrogate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2).

Because the MRLA is a suggested framework

for litigation, it does not interfere with that
Rule’s simple mandate for a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

Indeed,

the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a
heightened pleading requirement for employment
discrimination cases because it would conflict with
this Rule.

See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002).
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As such, the MRLA is flexible enough to

be applied to inter-ethnic discrimination cases that
do not involve Latino defendants.226

Indeed, it was

in Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan, a case not
involving Latinos, in which a federal judge took this
approach and came closest to demanding that
plaintiffs utilize what this Article characterizes as
the MRLA.227
In Ali, a self-described light-skinned Pakistani
citizen from the province of Punjab employed at the
National Bank of Pakistan’s New York branch alleged
that the Bank discriminated against him in favor of
darker-skinned Pakistani citizens from the province
of Sind.228

In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, the

court noted that although light-skinned employees
predominated in the lower-paid job positions, it was
problematic that no “evidence by way of expert
testimony or treatise was presented with respect to

226

While Latino inter-ethnic claims are the focus of

this Article, the MRLA, justifying the admission of
empirical data, should be just as helpful in
explicating the context of non-White-Anglo/African
American allegations of discrimination.
VIJAY PRASHAD, THE KARMA

OF

See, e.g.,

BROWN FOLK (2000) (discussing

the racial attitudes of Indians and their anti-Black
racism as well).

See also GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE

OF

PREJUDICE (1954) (describing the ubiquitous and
historically pervasive construction of “in-groups”
and “out-groups”).
227

Ali v. Nat’l Bank of Pak., 508 F. Supp. 611

(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
228

Id. at 613 - 14.
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color differences among the various provinces of
Pakistan, or discrimination based on color.”229

The

court was disturbed by the lack of a fuller record
because it was unclear whether a light-skinned
Pakistani who “is darker in complexion than those
commonly termed white in the United States”230
warranted “protected class status” under the
McDonnell Douglas231 prima facie evidentiary standard.
The court stated:
Suffice it to note that the presumption of
a protected class status on the basis of
color is bound up with an entire national
racial history. It may well be that there
are
indigenous
discriminatory
practices
around the world having nothing to do with
the American experience. However, there is
no basis on this record for the recognition
of
skin
color
as
a
presumptive
discriminatory criterion (rooted, one would
suppose,
in
the
intermingling
of
distinctive national or racial groups) in
employment in Pakistan, or among Pakistanis
in New York, under the McDonnell Douglas
guidelines.232
In short, the judge is asserting that when Title
VII cases are brought that implicate racial meanings
beyond the U.S. setting, a fuller record about those
meanings should be set forth in order for the
existing legal doctrine to be applied effectively.

B. The MRLA Benefits

When specifically applied to the context of
Latino inter-ethnic discrimination with its empirical
data regarding Latino anti-Black sentiment and the

229

Id. at 612.

230

Id.

231

McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

232

Ali, 508 F. Supp. at 613 - 14.
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idealization of whiteness, the MRLA enables an
inquiry into the manifestations of racial privilege
with a focus on how a defendant’s conduct positions
him or her as an agent of White supremacy, while not
being viewed as racially White himself or herself.
This is because the MRLA incorporates the
understanding that systems and norms of White
supremacy do not disappear simply because the census
count of racial Whites has diminished.233

Indeed, the

seduction of “performing whiteness” by subjugating
others continues to exist.234

233

This is because

See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE

PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 30 (1996) (describing the
need for employment discrimination doctrine to
acknowledge the importance of context in appreciating
how “each of us lives at the juncture of privilege in
some areas and subordination in others”); López,
supra note 29, at 93 (1998) (describing the process
of racialization as subject to the varying
contingencies of time, place, and identity);

see

also John Valery White, The Turner Thesis, Black
Migration, and the (Misapplied) Immigrant Explanation
of Black Inequality, 5 NEV. L.J. 6, 24, 24 - 29 (2004)
(describing the way in which the racial diversity of
Northern California in the 1940s, with its mixed
population of Mexicans, Chinese, Japanese, and
Filipino residents, still maintained a system of
White privilege that thoroughly segregated African
Americans from most employment opportunities despite
the absence of an official Jim Crow system).
234

“Performing whiteness” in its most narrow

interpretation is when individuals assert their claim
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to a White racial identity by evidencing “whiteness
in their character, religious practices and beliefs,
class orientation, language, ability to intermarry,
and a host of other traits that [have] nothing to do
with intrinsic racial grouping.”

John Tehranian,

Note, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation
and the Construction of Racial Identity in America,
109 YALE L.J. 817, 821 (2000) (applying Judith
Butler’s work on gender and the performance of
identity to the analysis of judicial evaluations of
immigrant petitions for naturalization).

But

performing whiteness can also refer more generally to
the ways in which people of color engage in
interracial distancing and attempt to “occupy both
the marginalized and the privileged ends of the
Black/White paradigm.”

Devon W. Carbado, Race to the

Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1311 (2002).

In this

way, “discrimination becomes a strategic tool
manipulated” by one racial or ethnic group against
another.

Louis Herns Marcelin, Identity, Power, and

Socioracial Hierarchies Among Haitian Immigrants in
Florida, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at
209, 223.

In addition to self-conscious attempts by

individuals to assert a White identity or an elevated
social status built on White privilege, there is also
the societal dynamic of particular ethnic groups
being offered certain facets of White privilege in
order to lessen their interest in forming alliances
with other racially subordinated groups.

See LANI

GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 227 (2002) (“By
offering this option of whiteness over time to
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“intergroup conflict can [often] be best understood
as the product of internalized white supremacy,”235

selected nonblack nonwhites, the racial binary of
black and white is preserved and race in the United
States is made more manageable for those seeking to
hold onto zero-sum power.”).

This can take the form

of actually incorporating new ethnic groups into the
category of whiteness as was done with the Irish over
time.

See NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW

THE

IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995).

It can also take the form of treating particular
groups as “honorary whites” in a particular place and
time.

See Mark Sawyer, Racial Politics in

Multiethnic America: Black and Latina/o Identities
and Coalitions, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note
4, at 265, 272 (“Hollywood portrayals of [Puerto
Rican actress Jennifer Lopez] emphasize the attempt
to portray Latinas/os as ‘potential whites.’”); Frank
H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and
Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 226 &
249 (1995) (using the concepts of “honorary whites”
and “constructive blacks” to describe the public
discourse about affirmative action and the attempt to
dissuade Asian Americans of their common interests
with African Americans).

Some scholars assert that

Latinos are particularly predisposed to being
“seduced into thinking [they] are White.”

Enid

Trucio-Haynes, Why “Race Matters:” Latcrit Theory and
Latina/o Racial Identity, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 1 (2001).
235

Chris K. Iijima, The Era of We-Construction:

Reclaiming the Politics of Asian Pacific American
Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the
Black/White Paradigm, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47, 75
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and the search for group-based status production.236
Accordingly, the MRLA seeks to infuse the analysis of
inter-ethnic discrimination claims with the
fundamental understanding that acts of racial
discrimination preserve racial privilege for whoever
is situated as racially valued in any given context,
and that such bias also furthers systemic White
privilege more generally, regardless of whether a
self-identified White-Anglo person is directly
involved.237
For example, legal scholars who analyzed the
1992 Los Angeles riots have noted the way in which
both Koreans and African Americans were alternatively
positioned as functionally White-privileged in
nativist constructs of the racial conflict in the
public discourse.238

Korean Americans were described

(1997).
236

Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The

Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044 (1995)
(theorizing that individuals are driven in part by
their competition for esteem and that racist behavior
is a process by which one racial group seeks to
produce esteem for itself by lowering the status of
another group).
237

See WILDMAN, supra note 233, at 33 (emphasizing the

need for employment discrimination doctrine to
include issues of privilege in its traditional
examination of subordination).
238

See, e.g., Janine Young Kim, Note, Are Asians

Black?:

The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and

the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White
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as immigrant foreigners in opposition to African
Americans with “White” U.S. citizenship, a
description that alternated with the description of
Korean Americans as pursuing the American
entrepreneurial dream as Whites in opposition to
African Americans as a socially problematic Black
underclass.239

The MRLA can recognize the White

privilege of non-White groups in varying contexts.240
Rather than introducing further complexity into
employment discrimination cases, the MRLA builds upon
the knowledge judges already have about the operation
of White privilege and provides a language for
describing its manifestation in non-White contexts.241

Paradigm, 108 YALE L.J. 2385, 2398 (1999).
239

Id.

240

See Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-

Semitism?

How Social Science Theories Identify

Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between
“Different” Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 406
(2000) (“[W]e need to know the definition of the
ingroup in a given context. . . .”).
241

Scholars have observed that trial judges in

antidiscrimination cases are disinclined to consider
the complexity of racial identity categories.

See

Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and
Social Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L.
REV. 629, 644 (2002).

The advantage of the MRLA is

that it builds upon pre-existing judicial knowledge
about White racial privilege.

It seeks to elucidate

the dynamics of inter-ethnic discrimination by
grounding its analysis in the operation of racial
privilege rather than the particularities of how a
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In addition, the vast literature regarding the
legacies of colonialism and postcolonial racial
stratification in multiracial societies around the
world gives further context to the premise of racial
privilege in multiracial/multi-ethnic societies.242
Another advantage of the MRLA is that it can identify
who is functionally privileged in a given context,
without losing sight of the continuing privilege of
self-identified White-Anglos.243

Thus, it does not

make the mistake of recasting White-Anglos “as just
another [racial] group competing with many others.”244
In this way, the focus on inter-ethnic disparate
treatment claims need not undermine the need to
continue enforcing discrimination claims against
White-Anglo defendants.

Similarly, the MRLA is not

meant to subvert the enforcement of disparate impact
claims, nor should it diminish an employer’s desire
to foster a diverse workplace.245

party to the case racially identifies.
242

See, e.g., COLONIAL DISCOURSE

AND

POST-COLONIAL THEORY: A

READER (Patrick Williams & Laura Chrisman eds., 1994).
243

Cf. WILDMAN, supra note 233, at 36 (“Privileging of

whiteness in the workplace can occur even when all
participants are African American.”).
244

Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise:

Equal Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority
Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (1995)
(concluding that the Supreme Court’s current equal
protection doctrine exploits the changing racial
demography of the United States to transform Whites
rhetorically into a victim group like any other).
245

Because this first wave of Latino inter-ethnic
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While the multiracial racism lens is an

employment discrimination cases have all been
litigated as individual disparate treatment claims,
this Article focuses upon the judicial
misunderstandings that arise in that context.

More

empirical data is needed before an assessment can be
made as to whether diverse workplaces also alter the
judicial application of traditional disparate impact
doctrine.

Nonetheless, it is quite possible that the

MRLA may have some utility for plaintiffs attempting
to prove that an employer’s proffered justification
for the employment practice in question is a pretext
for discrimination.

For instance, in EEOC v.

Consolidated Services, 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993),
the court noted the persuasiveness of the employer’s
expert witness in explaining the cultural factors
that would encourage a Korean-owned business to hire
mostly Korean workers to the exclusion of African
American workers.

If the plaintiff EEOC had deployed

the MRLA, it too could have proffered expert
testimony about the pre-existing racial attitudes of
Koreans informing the alleged employment practice of
word-of-mouth recruitment.

In short, for those

inter-ethnic discrimination plaintiffs able to
aggregate the statistical evidence to show a
disparate impact upon their racial or ethnic subgroup
from a particular employment practice, the MRLA may
further support the plaintiff’s case rather than
undermine it.

Similarly, the MRLA does not undermine

diversity in the workplace or to dispute the
overarching value of diversity in the workplace.

See

supra notes 138 - 139 and accompanying text.
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analytical approach that litigators will need to
persuade judges to consider, it is not one that
requires the enactment of new laws or other
legislative reform.246

Rather, it is a conceptual

framework that plaintiffs can use to displace the
judicial inclination towards the diversity defense
and its disregard for established legal doctrine.
For instance, if the paradigmatic case of Arrocha v.
CUNY,247 discussed in Part II of this Article, had
been crafted by the plaintiff using the proposed
MRLA, the court would not have summarily dismissed
the plaintiff’s claims of race and national-origin
discrimination, because the plaintiff would have been
better able to dispel the judicial enchantment with

246

In fact, the request for a judicial inquiry into

who is functionally advantaged and disadvantaged in a
specific racial hierarchy resonates with the post Civil War judicial assessments of who was
functionally White or Black for purposes of Jim Crow
segregation enforcement.

See, e.g., Gong Lum v.

Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (concluding that a child of
Chinese descent was functionally “colored” and thus
not qualified to enroll in Whites-only public
schools);

see also IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE

LEGAL CONSTRUCTION

OF

WHITENESS (Richard Delgado & Jean

Stefancic eds., 1996).

Although official Jim Crow

segregation has been abolished, racial hierarchies
continue as does the need to address the differential
employment status of those racially privileged and
racially disadvantaged.
247

Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9,

2004).
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(1) explicitly foregrounding

his narrative with the premise of inter-ethnic
hierarchy and bias; (2) focusing the inquiry on
whether there were racially advantaged and
disadvantaged employees among the diverse non-White
workers; (3) providing the social science data about
Latino racial attitudes; and (4) demonstrating the
applicability of established employment
discrimination doctrine to diverse workplaces.

In

Arrocha, the plaintiff’s statement that there was a
“disturbing culture of favoritism that favor[ed] the
appointments of white Cubans, Spaniards, and white
Hispanics from South America” was insufficient to
invoke the long legacy of racial hierarchy in Latin
America.248

For a judge focused on an understanding

of discrimination as solely a U.S. White/non-White
phenomenon, the Arrocha plaintiff needed to present
explicit documentation of racial privilege and bias
in non-White contexts.

Using the insights of the

multiracial racism lens, the plaintiff would have
been more likely to persuade the judge to consider
the empirical data about Latino racial attitudes and
their manifestation.

The plaintiff’s submission of

expert testimony regarding the long legacy of antiBlack bias against Afro-Latinos within Latin America
would have dispelled the judicial inclination to view
Latinos as homogeneous and interchangeable.

In turn,

the disruption of the judicial presumption of Latino
homogeneity would have eliminated the rationalization
that “[d]iversity in an employer’s staff undercuts an

248

Id. at *7.

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36

Hernández (CRCL)

01/26/09 9:45 AM

Page 121

inference of discriminatory intent.”249

Further,

established employment discrimination doctrine would
not have been overlooked.

Similarly, in other Latino

inter-ethnic discrimination cases in which the
plaintiffs are African American, the presentation of
empirical information about Latino anti-Black bias
would be useful in dismantling fanciful notions about
the inherent harmony of a diverse workplace.
Furthermore, the scholarly literature explaining how
systemic White privilege encourages non-White
racial/ethnic group members to harbor bias against
other non-Whites would also be useful.250

249

Id.

250

See supra note 234; see also FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN,

WHITE MASKS 10 - 30 (Charles Lam Markmann trans., Grove
Press 1967) (describing how subordinated group
members can internalize the biases of the privileged
class and thereby adopt disdain for other
subordinated group members).

In contrast, when the

EEOC files class actions alleging that an employer
has privileged a particular racial/ethnic group in
order to exclude another racial/ethnic group in its
employment decisions, it may instead find the
scholarly literature regarding the strategic
positioning of “middleman minorities” more useful for
informing a judge.
A

THEORY

OF

See, e.g., HUBERT BLALOCK, JR., TOWARD

MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 79 – 84 (1967); Edna

Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM.
SOC. REV. 583, 584 (1973).

This separate body of

literature may be more useful because it focuses upon
a White privileged-class interest in favoring one
racial/ethnic group over another.

In contrast, the
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The MRLA is a concept influenced by Charles
Lawrence’s articulation of a “cultural meaning test.”
In a 1987 Stanford Law Review article, he proposed
the overt judicial examination of context as a method
for recognizing racial meanings and motivations.251
Lawrence proposed the cultural meaning test as a
mechanism for helping judges address the harm of
unconscious racism in the equal protection context.
Lawrence suggested that judges look to the cultural
meaning of an allegedly discriminatory governmental
act as a method for identifying unconscious racism
that should be addressed and subjected to strict
scrutiny.

This could be done by considering evidence

regarding the historical and social context in which
a governmental decision was made.
Because Lawrence’s analysis focused on the
racial subordination of African Americans, his
articulation of the cultural meaning test relies upon
the usefulness of considering whether a significant
portion of the population views a particular action

internalized racism literature focuses upon the
racialized attitudes of non-White racial/ethnic group
members and is thus more applicable to establishing a
framework for understanding employment discrimination
cases in which non-Whites are the identified agents
of discrimination in a workplace dominated by nonWhites.
251

Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and

Equal Protection:

Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,

39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355 - 81 (1987) (using cognitive
theory to develop a cultural meaning test for
addressing the social harms of unconscious racism).
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In contrast, the MRLA

concerns itself with the racial and ethnic
discrimination of which much of the population in the
United States may very well be ignorant.
Accordingly, the MRLA instead encourages the search
for cultural meaning that is outside of the U.S. Jim
Crow racial history but serves as its functional
equivalent for understanding racial subordination in
the inter-ethnic context.
While no court has ever directly referenced the
Charles Lawrence cultural meaning test,253 “much of

252

Id. at 356.

253

Courts thus far have only cited Lawrence’s article

for its discussion of unconscious racism rather than
to apply the proposed cultural meaning test.

See,

e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 332 – 333
(1987); Crum v. Alabama, 198 F.3d 1305, 1321 (11th
Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38,
61 (1st Cir. 1999); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d
1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bishop,
959 F.2d 820, 827 - 28 (9th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 863 (10th Cir. 1989); Chin v.
Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004);
Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d
1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004); Dobbs-Weinstein v.
Vanderbilt Univ., 1 F. Supp. 2d 783, 801 (M.D. Tenn.
1998); United States v. Burroughs, 897 F. Supp. 205,
208 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Clary, 846 F.
Supp. 768, 778 - 79 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Harris v. Int’l
Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 - 16

(D. Me.

1991); Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467, 503 (W.D.
Mich. 1987); Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v. State,
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what judges do entails this kind of interpretation:
It requires the same skills they employ when they
decide a case by characterizing or interpreting a
line of precedent in the way that seems most true to
them.”254

Moreover, at least one Supreme Court case

implicitly supports the search for cultural meaning
in the manner proposed by the MRLA.

In St. Francis

College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court was presented with
the question of whether a person of Arabian ancestry
born in Iraq has standing to seek protection from
racial discrimination under the Section 1981 mandate
against racial discrimination in the making of
private and public contracts.255

The Court refused to

decide the case on the fact that under current racial
classifications Arabs are Caucasians and thus
precluded from raising a Section 1981 claim that they
are not treated like “white citizens.”256

Instead,

110 P.3d 947, 963 (Alaska 2005); State by Beaulieu v.
City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 575 (Minn.
1994).
254

Lawrence, supra note 251, at 362.

“If the

jurisprudential task is to give sense to broad
propositions of law -- deriving that sense from an
ongoing judicial interpretation of culturally created
moral norms -- then application of the proposed
cultural meaning test is clearly within the courts’
competence.”
255

Id. at 386.

St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604

(1987).
256

Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination that

denies individuals the same rights “as [are] enjoyed
by white citizens.”

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
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the Court held that:
Based on the history of § 1981, we have
little trouble in concluding that Congress
intended to protect from discrimination
identifiable classes of persons who are
subjected
to
intentional
discrimination
solely because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics.
Such discrimination is
racial
discrimination
that
Congress
intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not
it would be classified as racial in terms
of modern scientific theory.257
In effect, the Court looked beyond the attempts at
formalizing what constitutes a racial group for
coverage under discrimination law, and instead sought
to have the law address the reality of racial
discrimination in our more racially and ethnically
diverse society.

It did this by recognizing that

those often viewed racially as Caucasian, as was the
St. Francis College plaintiff, can also be treated as
non-White depending upon the context.258

The MRLA

proposed here would extend that analysis to
recognizing how those often viewed as racially nonWhite can still exert White privilege in various

257

481 U.S. at 613.

258

St. Francis College has been relied on to

recognize that Jews, Iranians, and Italians can be
protected from racial discrimination under Section
1981 even though they are today racially classified
as Caucasian.

See Shaare Tefila Congregation v.

Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (recognizing Jews as
protected under Section 1981); Amini v. Oberlin
Coll., 259 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing
Iranians as protected under Section 1981); Bisciglia
v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 45 F.3d 223 (7th
Cir. 1995) (recognizing Italians as protected under
Section 1981).
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contexts.
In order to be able to examine an employment
context for racial discrimination in a richer
demographic workforce, the MRLA will entail an
engagement with the particularities of how various
racial and ethnic groups have historically treated
and continue to stereotype one another.

For

instance, in the context of Latino inter-ethnic
discrimination claims, plaintiffs’ lawyers would have
available to them a vast literature on Latino
Studies259 and Ethnic Studies260 with which to
understand and present such claims.

Such literature

would be especially useful in the context of Latino
inter-ethnic discrimination claims as a mechanism to
remedy the ill-informed characterizations of Latino
racial attitudes that currently pervade the public
discourse and unconsciously influence judges and
other legal decision-makers.261

259

Legal scholars

See Pedro A. Cabán, Moving from the Margins to

Where?

Three Decades of Latino/a Studies, 1 LATINO

STUD. 5 (2003) (describing the evolution of Latino
Studies).
260

See generally INTRODUCTION

TO

ETHNIC STUDIES: A READER

(Phillip Q. Yang ed., 1999).
261

See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism:

Judicial Conduct and New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 - 25 (2000)
(articulating a theory of “institutional racism” to
explain how judges can unconsciously follow elaborate
social scripts that manifest prejudice and racism
without a conscious intent to discriminate);
also LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION

BY

see

DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36

Hernández (CRCL)

01/26/09 9:45 AM

Page 127

Laurens Walker and John Monahan describe this process
as the admission of empirical information to
construct a frame of reference for deciding factual
issues.262

While this is a form of judicial notice

that involves neither legislative facts nor
adjudicative facts as contemplated in Federal Rule of
Evidence 201, “a growing number of courts have held
that the use of social frameworks to correct beliefs
that are erroneous does indeed ‘assist the trier of
fact.’”263

This is because the Federal Rules of

Evidence do not bar this third use of social science
in law,264 thereby allowing a court to admit empirical
information “to keep it responsive to its changing
environment.”265
Judges customarily admit empirical information
through the use of expert witnesses for the purpose
of assisting a trier of fact to understand the
evidence.266

For instance, judges have accepted the

ROUTINE 135 - 37 (2006) (describing how discrimination
in the legal system can occur by default, due to
legal actors’ unconscious biases and resort to
automatic racial stereotypes).
262

Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks:

A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559,
570 (1987) (defining social framework as “the use of
general conclusions from social science research in
determining factual issues in a specific case”).
263

Id. at 580.

264

Id. at 582.

265

E.F. Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward a Study of

Judicial Notice, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 210, 210 (1967).
266

Walker & Monahan, supra note 262, at 583.
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presentation of expert testimony on the deployment of
racial stereotypes in the workplace in order to
disabuse fact-finders of what they believe is “common
sense.”267

In Walker v. State, a law professor

provided expert testimony on behalf of an African
American state trooper alleging discriminatory
discharge.268

The testimony was based on research in

the literature of racial stereotyping that permitted
the expert witness to conclude that it was extremely
likely that the plaintiff was the victim of racebased performance evaluations.

Expert testimony will

be especially useful in delineating how Latinos and
other populations of color racialize one another.269
Such information would be presented for the sole
purpose of creating a social framework to construct a
frame of reference for deciding the factual issues,
and not as a vehicle for imparting a general group
bias to an individual defendant on the legal question
of discriminatory intent.270

In this way, the MRLA

267

SPRIGGS, supra note 145, § 17.03[3][g].

268

No. EV 87-12-C (S.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 1987).

269

See WANG supra note 261, at 136 - 37 (explaining

that one way to counteract a factfinder’s unconscious
biases is to present more normative clarity about the
role of race in the case).
270

See FED. R. EVID. 702 (authorizing the use of expert

witnesses with specialized knowledge to “assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence”); see also
JOHN WILLIAM STRONG, MCCORMICK

ON

EVIDENCE § 12 at 50 (1992)

(“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence do not permit
opinion on law except questions of foreign law . . .
.”); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE:
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will call on expert witnesses to act in their
traditional role of educating the decision-maker
about their areas of expertise.271

One federal

district court has already been very explicit about
the need for such expert testimony and literature.272
As discussed earlier in this section, Ali v. National
Bank of Pakistan represents what is sure to become a
growing dynamic of cases presenting judges with
inter-ethnic discrimination claims that they are
unable to assess and evaluate without in-depth
assistance from the plaintiff.273

It is at least

encouraging that the judge in Ali expressed a
willingness to receive expert testimony and
documentation about systems of racialization with
which he was not familiar.

It is in such spaces of

willingness that the multiracial racism lens concept
may gain traction in the same manner that some judges

PRACTICE UNDER

THE

RULES § 7.7 at 905 (2d ed. 1999)

(“[When] parties offer expert testimony on the
content of law during the ordinary course of trial,
it is properly rejected.”).
271

MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 270, § 7.6 at 902

(“Often the best thing an expert can do is to provide
standards or criteria, estimates of feasibility or
likelihood, or descriptions of social frameworks that
juries can then constructively use in resolving more
particular issues relating to such things a due care,
intent or purpose, and who likely did what and why.”)
(emphasis added).
272

See Ali v. Nat’l Bank of Pak., 508 F. Supp. 611

(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
273

See supra notes 228 - 232 and accompanying text.
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have implicitly and explicitly applied Critical Race
Theory in their analysis of social issues.274

Once

the judiciary is made more aware of the existence of
inter-ethnic discrimination expertise, judges may
become more disposed to exercising their discretion
to appoint expert witnesses themselves.275

In

addition to using expert witnesses, empirical
research can be presented in briefs, and later in the
proposal for jury instructions.276

Over time a set of

pattern jury instructions could be developed to
standardize the use of a set of social science
findings.277

This will in turn become useful for

those plaintiffs financially unable to obtain expert

274

AN

See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
INTRODUCTION 109 - 19 (2001) (describing some cases

in which judges have either explicitly or implicitly
used Critical Race Theory in their opinions).
275

See FED. R. EVID. 706 (“[T]he court may on its own

motion or on the motion of any party enter an order
to show cause why expert witnesses should not be
appointed . . . and may appoint expert witnesses of
its own selection . . . .”).
276

Walker & Monahan, supra note 262, at 588.

The

model for inserting empirical information into legal
memoranda is the “Brandeis brief.”

See BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 98 (5th ed. 1983) (“Form of appellate brief
in which economic and social surveys and studies are
included along with legal principles and citations
and which takes its name from Louis D. Brandeis,
former Associate Justice of Supreme Court, who used
such briefs while practicing law.”).
277

See Walker & Monahan, supra note 262, at 597 - 98.
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Given the longstanding use

of statistical empirical data in employment
discrimination cases to provide context for an
allegation of discrimination, judges should be
amenable to the presentation of other forms of
empirical data as well.
With respect to Latino inter-ethnic
discrimination claims, plaintiffs will need not only
to develop the record with regard to Latino racial
biases, but also to countermand the misleading public
discourse that currently exists about Latinos and
race.278

Specifically, much of the public discourse

about Latinos and racism has focused on the depiction
of a problematic relationship between Latinos and
African Americans and has presented Latinos as racial
innocents incapable of racial discrimination.279

278

See Sawyer, supra note 234, at 270 (discussing how

the public emphasis placed on “Latinas/os as
representative of a new mixed-race America is meant
to distance Latinas/os from Blacks and to redefine
race in U.S. society as a concept not so very
different from the Latin American myth of racial
democracy, which effectively denies racism by
emphasizing miscegenation”).
279

See, e.g., NICOLÁS C. VACA, THE PRESUMED ALLIANCE: THE

UNSPOKEN CONFLICT BETWEEN LATINOS

AND

BLACKS

AND

WHAT IT MEANS

FOR

AMERICA (2004) (presenting race relations between
African Americans and Latinos as unharmonious because
of the resentment African Americans are presumed to
have for Latinos).

But see Sawyer, supra note 234,

at 270 (describing how authors like Vaca
“overemphasize differences between Latinas/os and
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Given the fact that the vast majority of reported
Latino inter-ethnic claims to date involve claims of
anti-Black bias, it is especially important to have a
more complete picture of Latino racial attitudes as
described in Part I of this Article.

The value of

the MRLA, with its attention to racial hierarchy and
privilege in diverse workplace settings, is that it
validates the need to submit empirical information to
expand the judicial understanding of how employment
discrimination is manifested amidst workplace
diversity.
Because of the long legacy of White/non-White
racism in the United States, discussion of race has
rightly focused on the White/non-White paradigm of
U.S. race relations and its effects on civil rights
enforcement.

But the changing demographics of the

United States mean that we need to expand the
judicial analysis of racism to include considerations
of how groups of color can be complicit and even
active agents in discrimination against other groups
of color.

Accordingly, the national dialogue about

race needs to examine each ethnic group’s racial
attitudes in order to have a complete picture of race
relations in today’s United States, and of the
growing dynamic of inter-ethnic civil rights claims.
The failure to address the interplay of diversity
discourse and inter-ethnic discrimination claims will
undermine the social importance of equality in the

African American and ignore political and ideological
convergences . . . [and also] overemphasize conflict
in the service of an assimilationist political
agenda”).
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Allowing diversity discourse to proceed

unchecked in employment discrimination cases will
leave open the very concrete possibility that
employers will begin to construct their workplaces as
“diverse” to ward off lawsuits, while simultaneously
maintaining a racial hierarchy.281

The MRLA proposed

here is but one possible method for more effectively
navigating the realities of racism in a multiracial
world.

The concept seeks to focus judges on the

applicability of established employment

280

Richard Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race:

Old Targets, New Opportunities, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1269,
1272 (2006) (“The black-white binary paradigm of race
thus requires expansion to deal with our increasingly
multicultural, multiracial society -- and even,
sometimes, to do justice to the black cause.”).
281

See Carl G. Cooper, Diversity: Denied, Deferred or

Preferred, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 685, 687 (2005) (“[A]
diverse workforce cuts down on litigation.

It is

very difficult when you have all groups, all racial
groups and all kinds of individuals, sexual
orientation, disability, age, all employed by the
same employer to mount a successful discrimination
lawsuit.”).
[A]n anecdotal example is the statement of a
Filipino
American
who,
in
a
recent
interview, said that she and other Asian
Americans are promoted to and kept at low
management positions so that they can do the
face-to-face firing of African Americans and
Latino employees, thereby immunizing their
employers from Title VII suits; after all,
how
can
one
racial
minority
illegally
discriminate against another?
Eric K. Yamamoto, Conflict and Complicity: Justice
Among Communities of Color, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 495,
497 (1997).
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discrimination doctrine to the context of interethnic discrimination.

Such an endeavor is

imperative if inter-ethic discrimination allegations
are to receive the full inquiry that they deserve.
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